ROOT & BRANCH 8

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THE SHAH IS DEAD — LONG LIVE THE CALIPH ■ CHINESE ROADS TO STATE CAPITALISM ■ INTRODUCTION TO MARXIAN THEORY ■ REVIEWS ■ CORRESPONDENCE

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INTRODUCTION

During the past two years, *Root & Branch* has sponsored a series of forums on various topics. The first two articles in this issue are expanded versions of talks given at two of these forums. The overthrow of the Shah in Iran was achieved by a mass movement with a large degree of popular initiative; to us it seems especially important as a demonstration of the power of a population to overthrow a heavily armed regime. At the same time, it was a revolt largely fought in the name of a revival of past ideologies and institutions. It has led to an exaltation of the power of the Islamic clergy; to the attack on certain progressive tendencies of capitalist development, such as sexual equality, introduced by the Shah; and to a growing repression against the left. Two Iranian friends have tried to explain the constellation of forces behind this situation, and the historical process through which it developed; they have also translated some interesting leaflets by Iranian workers' groups.

Though Maoism seems to be finally dead in China, it is still important to figure out what it was. Bill Russell's article deals with Maoism as a "development strategy." Basing his account on a comparison of China with the Soviet Union, he describes the fortunes of Mao's policy with a view both to the divisions among China's rulers and to the impact of the Maoist strategy on the Chinese working class.

Previous issues of *Root & Branch* have discussed the likelihood that capitalism today is carrying us into a major economic crisis, and the failure of "economic science" to affect this situation or even explain it. This is no doubt the reason, at least in part, for the revival of interest in Marx's theory of capitalism and critique of economic theory. *Capital* can be difficult reading, however, largely because of the barriers erected between Marx and his potential readers by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and by academic economists and social "scientists." Paul Mattick, Jr.'s article is the first in a series, intended to serve as a reader's guide to Marx's work.

Our book review section is devoted to a discussion of Nancy Chodorow's book on psychological aspects of the reproduction of the sexual division of labor. The process of deciding whether or not to print this review sparked a controversy within *Root & Branch* on the place of psychological theorizing in political analysis, which we hope will lead to further articles on this question. Finally, we are glad to say that our requests for comments and criticism are beginning to bear fruit. We hope the correspondence section will continue to expand: please write us!

As ever, our major problem—aside from a chronic shortage of money—is poor distribution. Readers who would like copies of *Root & Branch* to distribute to bookstores or at meetings should write us.

CONTENTS

THE SHAH IS DEAD: LONG LIVE THE CALIPH

Riza Pahlevi was an illiterate soldier in the Iranian army until he caught the eye of British imperialism in the 1920s. Seeing in him an alternative to the unpopular and feeble Qajar dynasty, the British gradually worked him up the ranks. After the creation of the Pahlevi dynasty by a coup d'etat, Riza Shah served British interests by giving them control over Iran's oil and supporting their efforts to contain the revolutionary government in Russia. In 1941, however, alarmed by his pro-Hitler posture, the British and Russians forced Riza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammed.

Riza Shah had tried, with some success, to build up a national industrial bourgeoisie during the war by taking advantage of Anglo-German competition. In 1937-38, for instance, Germany had supplied Iran with a basic steel industry. In the late 1940s, the war-torn economy of the imperialist powers and the Anglo-American power struggle for hegemony again offered a brief opportunity for the expression of national sentiments in Iran. Bourgeois nationalism consolidated and manifested itself in the National Front, while anti-fascist and Stalinist intellectuals and students joined with some workers from the developing industries behind a number of aristocratic leaders in the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party. The consolidation of nationalist sentiments within the two parties, in combination with the weakened position of the British owners of Iranian oil, led to a movement for the nationalization of oil. The Mossadegh government of 1951, in fact, realized this dream of the Iranian nationalists.

Although popular support for Mossadegh's government had forced the Shah to flee the country, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the help of Iranian generals restored him to power by a coup d'etat that overthrew Mossadegh in August 1953. It would be unhistorical, however, to attribute the success of the coup to the CIA alone. The composition and unevenness of class forces at the time showed in a lack of unity and coordination between the major parties and forces at work. The political movement was confined to the towns, while the countryside, with 75 percent of the population, was completely isolated from politics. (In this respect, the movement of 1979 represents a major change, reflecting the economic and social development of Iran in the last quarter century.) The National Front, never organized as a real political party, had no organizational ties with the bulk of the people. Although they had often backed popular movements in Iran's past, the Moslem leaders were unable to assume the leadership of this movement. Their influence declined sharply after a prominent religious leader of the time, Ayatollah Kashani, as a result of his compromise with British imperialism, withdrew his support from the Mossadegh government. The Tudeh Party, despite its clandestine organization (numbering about 600 officers) within the army, made no move. In addition, the Tudeh's complete subservience to the wishes and directives of Moscow proved fatal to their influence. Their slogan, "Nationalize oil in South Iran," drove people from the Tudeh to Mossadegh. (The Russians imported oil from fields in the North.)

A period of intense repression followed the 1953 coup. The army and security forces rounded up thousands of trade unionists and members of the major political organizations. The sharpest edge of repression was directed against the communists of the Tudeh Party: a score were executed and many jailed.

The victory of this dictatorship heavily dependent on the U.S. was the political counterpart to Iran's changing role in a world economy dominated since the end of World War II by

Associated Press

Iranian women demonstrating in Teheran yesterday. They carried pictures of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, their spiritual leader, and of a young man who was killed in a recent violence.

American capital. In the years following the war, the export of capital from the dominant countries to the dominated countries was chiefly oriented toward the control of raw materials and the extension of markets. Nevertheless, Iran remained basically an agricultural country with 75 percent of its population living in rural areas, mostly self-sufficiently. The cities were essentially trade centers with petty commodity production and a small bourgeoisie. Landowners, living in the cities, were sometimes also middle traders. The Shah, himself one of the biggest landowners, was the figurehead of an oligarchy that held social power.

After 1953, the Iranian government centralized its operations, establishing a strong state power as part of an attempt to develop the economy. By the early 1960s, however, the economy was in chaos. Along with a negative balance of payments, the Shah's budget deficit had become chronic. The budget depended entirely on oil revenues, which fell during 1958-62 with the collapse of the world oil price.

During the 1960s, as part of the continuing restructuring of world capital, developed countries were trying to make the Third World more dependent on the system by opening up their agricultural sectors to capital, thus speeding up their total integration into the world capitalist market. At this time India was experiencing its "Green Revolution," while the U.S. was imposing the "Alliance for Progress" on Latin America. Adjusting Iranian society to world capitalism, the regime undertook a series of governmental development plans. Such planning had already been initiated in 1948. The earlier attempts at state stimulation, however, were not transforming the country rapidly enough to meet the growing needs of imperialism. Therefore, with the help of the Americans, in 1962 a package called the "White Revolution" was introduced to meet these goals. This package was a series of reforms whose main element was a land reform distributing land among the peasantry.

There was a considerable tranformation of the class structure in rural and urban areas following the execution of the land reform in the 1962-71 period. The state paid "expropriated" landlords partly in cash and partly in industrial bonds, thus transforming them directly into industrialists. While the reform was a failure for Iranian agriculture, it did produce substantial change in the social and political structure of the country. The main results of the land reform were: (1) The establishment of a market economy in rural areas and the destruction of the earlier self-sufficient economy. This brought an increasing social dependence of country on town. (2) The creation of almost 1.5 million landless families out of half of the rural population. Having nothing to sell except their labor, the majority of them migrated to the cities while the rest became agricultural laborers. (3) The migration of rural wealth to town to function as capital.

In other words, the result of the land reform was the establishment and expansion, over a ten-year period, of the capitalist mode of production in Iran. Of course the ex-landowners who had transferred their wealth to town either functioned as commercial capitalists or had their wealth absorbed by rivals. The Shah himself was the first to transform his wealth into capital and become a major capitalist.

Under the pressure of the Kennedy administration, and in order to gain popular support for the "White Revolution," the Shah initiated a period of relative democratic freedom. But popular support went to the opposition rather than the Shah.

The opposition in the early 1960s was mainly composed of the local bourgeoisie and the clergy. That the bourgeoisie's opposition to the regime was mild and hesitant was not surprising, since the Shah's proposed economic reforms included all that they had dreamed of for many years. The bourgeoisie mainly objected to the regime's dictatorial nature and its lack of respect for the Iranian constitution. The bourgeois opposition, thus, organized itself behind the slogan, "Yes to the proposed reforms, no to despotism!" By taking a more intransigent stand, the clergy broadened its popular support, particularly among the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the bulk of the working population, who were suffering the most precarious economic conditions. By the spring of 1963, the mass movement was virtually under the clergy's leadership.

The clergy's intransigence and radicalism stemmed from two different components within its social basis. First, the lower level of the Moslem clerical hierarchy, which was economically and socially tied to the poorer strata of the petty bourgeoisie, accounted for the radical anti-dictatorial and anti-imperialist character of the religious movement. The second tendency, expressed the fear and resistance of the upper clerical orders, whose own economic and political power was threatened by the Shah's reforms. Islam has traditionally involved a system of wealth redistribution via taxes paid to the mosques, which distributed some to the poor and accumulated much more. Their revenues from this religious taxation declined with the spread of Westernization and its attendant secularization. Although their large, directly controlled land holdings escaped confiscation, they were badly hurt by the reform's displacement of the peasantry who had always worked these lands. Also, a major part of the mullah's traditional role was usurped by the army people sent into the rural areas to educate the villagers. Finally, the Islamic institutions were further weakened by such reforms as women's civil emancipation, brought by the general transformation—economic, political, and cultural—Iran was undergoing at that time.

By June 1963, the mass movement took the character of a popular religious uprising; but within three or four days the army crushed the movement, killing over 10,000 demonstrators and arresting their leaders, including the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was subsequently exiled. The bloody days of June put an end to the period of relative democratic freedom. The Shah's regime never gained mass support, but during the next fourteen years it went unchallenged by any serious mass movement, thanks to its repressive apparatus, its economic policy, and its huge oil revenues, which allowed a definite rise in the standard of living. The only organized resistance to the regime during those years came from underground guerrilla organizations. The People's Fedayeen drew many people from the student movement, ex-Tudeh members, and Maoist or Third-Worldist activists, but remained confined within the intellectual strata of the society and was isolated from the working class. The Islamic Mujahedeen guerrilla organization, which drew members from the National Front and attempted to use religion as a basis for radical political ideology, was more successful in getting the sympathy of broader layers of society. Despite its limits, the armed struggle such groups initiated in 1971 had a definite impact. The rapid, enormous growth of these groups after the collapse of the Shah's power is largely the effect of their activity during the preceding years of political dormancy, as well as the publicity given them by SAVAK propaganda.

The "White Revolution" resulted in an acceleration of the capital flow into Iran, a rapid growth of the available labor force, and a prospect—or rather, an illusion—of future prosperity. In 1972, 1.5 million people were employed in 225,000 manufacturing establishments, although a large number of these were small-scale artisan units and only 7 percent of the working population was employed in modern industrial units. In spite of chaos and declining production in agriculture, the rate of growth in other branches was so high that the GNP grew rapidly in the first ten years of the White Revolution. According to government figures (which, while exaggerated, give some indication), GNP increased by 8 percent in the 1960s and by 14 percent in the early 1970s, even before the oil boom.

In the period of 1962-77, the urban population grew from 25 percent to 50 percent of the country's total population, which itself grew from 23 to 35 million in the same period. Teheran, which had 2,000,000 inhabitants in 1963, has a population of 5,000,000, according to the latest statistics. But Iran was still a backward, ill-planned society, without a social-welfare system, adequate housing, or even such basics as traffic control. Having always been dominated by foreign powers or despots, the bourgeoisie had no history of self-rule; the Shah's government, therefore, had no legitimacy. When it could no longer run things, social and political chaos prevailed.

Thus, urban expansion that accompanied the establishment of the capitalist mode of production had its own problems and consequences. For the lower strata of people, especially for the non-industrial working population, this meant poor working conditions, poor living conditions, a lack of housing, and unemployment. The masses of people moving into the cities, who lived in shanty towns around the industrial centers and received no benefit from the national wealth, moved into opposition to the system.

Although government-controlled unions existed, even the most primitive organization among workers themselves could not survive. The strike at the Johan Chit weaving factory was the first major struggle of this period. Two hundred unarmed workers marched toward Teheran from their factory, situated thirty miles to the north. Midway, however, the police launched an attack by land and air that killed forty and wounded many more. (In revenge the Fedayeen executed the factory owner in 1973.) In the early 1970s, however, such isolated wildcat strikes for higher wages occurred more frequently in the more modern industrial units. Strikers were often machine-gunned by the angry ruling class, but the continuation of the strikes forced the capitalists to concede to some demands. Nonetheless, no organizational attempt from the workers' side was tolerated.

Among the upper strata of society, as the rule of industrial capital increased, the traditional middle-traders, called bazzari, became the sworn enemies of the regime. The Pahlevi court had the upper hand in essentially all major investments. As a result, the part of the bourgeoisie without a close link to the Pahlevi dynasty became dissatisfied, simply because it did not have a proper share of the cake. This part of the bourgeoisie was also unhappy about the autocratic, bureaucratic regime and its expenditure of funds in non-productive sectors, such as the military, from which it saw no immediate benefit.

With the devastation of agriculture, the government had to import more agricultural goods. Also, alignment with U.S. defense policy in the region in the post-Vietnam era meant that more money had to go to the military. The result was a budget

deficit in 1972. The oil boom that began in 1973, however, bought more time for the regime and the Shah announced that Iran was heading toward a "Great Civilization." Government development plans expanded: whereas the first seven-year plan had a projected expenditure of $350 million; after the oil boom the fifth four-year plan bore a $69 billion tag.

As independent industry, nevertheless, failed to develop, the economy became increasingly dependent on oil. From 19.5 percent of GNP in 1972, oil exports rose to 49.7 percent in 1977, when they accounted for 77 percent of government revenues and 87 percent of foreign earnings. Meanwhile, the rapid growth of bureaucracy and militarism was sustained by an increase in circulating money, which, given the constant level of production, produced inflation. In addition, during 1974-77 period, the worldwide inflation swallowed a certain percentage of oil income (the Shah himself put the figure at 25 percent). If we take into account, furthermore, the devaluation of the dollar and a 10 percent decrease in oil production, we can see why rising expectations were just a prelude to hopelessness. The wealthy and respected regime—which had loaned Pan Am a large cash sum (with the slogan "Iran needs the West"), bought 25 percent of Krupp stock, and loaned a billion dollars cash to the British government—had to struggle to avoid bankruptcy in 1977 and ended the last two years with $4 and $7 billion budget deficits.

The bureaucracy, which had expanded to reach new budgetary frontiers in the 1973-75 period and had gained momentum for further expansion, responded to its now shrinking budget by becoming ever more corrupt. The same phenomenon faced the bourgeoisie: they were expanding in expectation of future income that failed to materialize. Rocked by the vicissitudes of the world market and politics, the Iranian economy revealed all the more clearly its structural weaknesses—the deficiencies of its dependent, foreign-dominated industry and the complete devastation of its agriculture. Money required for capital investment in modernizing its agriculture, whose earlier method of production had disintegrated under the land reform, went into speculation instead, with the result that 70-80 percent of the national food supply in recent years has had to be imported, largely from the U.S.

Hoping to reduce its budget deficit in 1976, the government started to raise taxes, which just produced more inflation and more dissatisfaction. While more people joined the working population in its growing opposition to the regime, SAVAK, the notorious secret police, nevertheless managed to dismantle nearly all the nuclei of working-class organization. The only institution the government could not openly oppose and demolish was the Islamic clergy, with a network of thousands of mosques throughout the country and an ideology (particularly that of the Shiite sect) well suited to an oppositional role. In the past 300 years the Shiite hierarchy had customarily played an influential political role in Iran, where it remains the dominant sect. Its clergy have been directly involved in all the major upheavals of the last seventy years.

This Islamic ideology was seen as representing a potential alternative to the Shah's regime by people who were dissatisfied with their present and afraid of their future. Hundreds of thousands of new and poor inhabitants of the cities, burdened with the remnants of their past, identified themselves with the clerical opposition. These people joined with more traditional allies of the clergy, such as the shopkeepers and middle-traders, to swell the Islamic movement, espousing such notions as Islamic government (which traditionally means a populist government with a simple life for the leaders, to whom everyone is to have direct access) and Islamic justice (which would use the Koranic code of "an eye for an eye," with swift-

Kahan Airmail Edition, no. 318 (Wednesday, 30 May 1979).

Teheran. Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan has issued a memorandum regarding counterrevolutionary activities in factories and workshops, the text of which runs as follows:

> In the name of God.
> Dear Factory Workers:
>
> I would like to mention a few points regarding my previous speeches and visits of revolutionary leaders, representatives of the Labor Ministry, and factory officials. In reference to the reports from the above sources, some construction, road-building, and manufacturing-plant workers have reduced their output at the urging of counter-revolutionary activists or as a consequence of their own unrealistic demands. These activities have caused a significant decrease in the country's economic output and development. As a result, essential production and total wage payments have dropped. It is obvious that the aim of putting the factories in working order is not for the production of profit or in the interest of the employers, but rather to decrease the rate of unemployment, which is the most important problem for the Provisional Revolutionary Government and is also in your own interest.

In the same memorandum Mr. Bazargan went on to declare that the government and employers have no source of wealth other than the national industrial production, trade, and reconstruction activities, which are the main sources of revenue for the private and government sectors. Unless these systems operate properly, there will be no source of revenue for wages, expenditures, and payments. All strikes and demands against the labor law, all interferences from strike committees or workers' committees regarding the management of plants and job appointments, and all disruptions in the factories, are considered counter-revolutionary acts and are against the national interest.

The Prime-Minister in his letter warned that these disorders and counter-revolutionary activities would not be tolerated in the future. He has ordered the stoppage of wage payments in the struck factories. Those involved in illegal interference, conspiracies, and counter-revolutionary incitement will be prosecuted.

The Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic expects all workers, distinguished colleagues who have cooperated with other classes, and deprived Iranians—who struggled for their freedom, independence, and Islam; who have sacrified for God and the Nation; and who have helped achieve the Revolution's initial victory—should remain united with the Government and the Nation to ensure the ultimate victory of the Revolution by stopping internal and external counter-revolutionary forces from ruining our economy and the Islamic Revolution.

Associated Press

A woman displaying currency bearing the image of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini instead of that of the Shah. The notes, which the Bakhtiar Government does not recognize, appeared yesterday in Teheran among supporters of the Ayatollah.

ly rendered judgment based on eyewitness reports and without regard for wealth).

By the end of 1976, after numerous bloody confrontations, the government was forced to concede the demands of shanty-town inhabitants. At this time the clergy were joined by another opposition force, the National Front. With such leaders as Sanjabi and Barzargan (at the center of the government today), the Front represented the political wishes of the fraction of the Iranian bourgeoisie excluded from power by the Shah. Their hesitant opposition to the regime (initially encouraged by Carter's "human rights" policy) and their fear of and antagonism to a violent and radical mass movement isolated them from the rebellious population. Driven by their hatred for the Shah, the masses followed Khomeini, who by consistently calling for the overthrow of the monarchy became their sole leader.

5 September 1978 saw an anti-Shah demonstration of more than 3,000,000 people. Three days later, on Black Friday, the regime responded by slaughtering thousands of demonstrators in the center of Teheran. From then until the following Februàry, a continuous crescendo of rebellion opposed the Iranian populace to the Pahlevi regime. A general strike, joined by the economically crucial oil workers, whom neither a 100 percent wage increase nor army threats sent back to work, was matched by daily mass street demonstrations. Even the Shah's departure "on vacation" and his appointing the liberal Bakhtiar government had no effect on the mass movement. Finally, an armed insurrection, carried out simultaneously in Teheran and other major cities during 9-11 February, in part by left organizations, consolidated the power of Khomeini.

Soon after his designated government, led by Mehdi Bazargan, took office, Khomeini proclaimed the end of the revolution and the beginning of the process of reconstruction. While there is no question that a period of reconstruction follows every revolution, the question remains, reconstruction for whom? The answer in Iran was clear. The workers were told to return to work (see box) and all revolts were labeled counterrevolutionary.

The content of the rebellion was in fact determined by what the masses could no longer tolerate, the Shah's regime. Although successful in achieving this goal, Khomeini had no concrete social program for the future. In any case, aside from the nationalization of some businesses, no drastic change is really possible in the country's economy. Meanwhile, the social forces, held together by the struggle against the Shah, are flying apart in search of their own ends.

Politically, the current government represents an uneasy compromise between Khomeini's forces, including the bazaaris, who want the benefits accruing from a larger role in politics after their efforts against the Shah, and the more modern sectors of the bourgeoisie. Bazargan and Sanjabi are representative of the latter group in their orientation toward modernism, which for them means political democracy as well as banks charging interest in contravention of Koranic law. While the Khomeini people are politically more primitive, seeing the official left only as a threat, people like Bazargan might be quite open to using the Tudeh Party—currently eagerly espousing Islam, which they proclaim as identical in substance to "scientific socialism"—to discipline the workers. The same frictions were briefly visible in the April women's rights demonstrations, which pitted a modern bourgeois-leftist coalition against Khomeini. This conflict was very quickly resolved, it may be remembered, as soon as deeper issues of the nature of the new regime were raised. At the moment of writing, the Islamic group faces no real opposition—witness the rapid collapse of the "progressive" opposition around the Ayatollah Teleghani at the end of April. On the other hand, as a social

group whose day is gone, the bazaaris in fact have no possibility to affect policy to any great extent. While the big bourgeoisie would probably not mind an army coup that would continue the White Revolution without (or even with) the Shah, in the meantime they haven't much to lose simply by waiting for the necessities of modern economics and politics to mold the Islamic Republic in a satisfactory way. And, ultimately, Khomeini must support the needs of the bourgeoisie if his regime is to survive. Islamic banks will collect service charges if they don't demand interest. In general, Khomeini's illusions about the eternal validity of the Koran will have to make some allowance for the impossibility of a real return to the past.

Meanwhile, the Caliph (traditional term for a religious leader with supreme political power) will make Iran a good country for businessmen. His regime has a potential for a worse repression than the Shah's; now not just SAVAK, but the religious population as a whole, is on the lookout for enemies of the Revolution. Already the mullah-controlled neighborhood organizations are functioning to identify and arrest leftists. Those who decry the rapid execution of the Shah's collaborators (shot without public trial, no doubt, to prevent their naming their many colleagues now serving in the Revolutionary regime) will not protest the terror against the left.

The left survives, for the moment, thanks to the arms seized during the final insurrection against the Shah (an estimated 70,000 guns) and to support from the liberal bourgeoisie. With the failure of the revolution to achieve noticeable gains in terms of living standards, the left groups are beginning to attract some popular support. But, at the time of writing, mass politics overwhelmingly means the backward-looking Moslem movement; even at the universities members of religious organizations far outnumber the leftists. What is most likely is an effort on the part of the government to destroy the left while Khomeini still has the support of the population.

But despite the combination of mass support and repression of the opposition, fundamental unsolved problems will make social stabilization difficult. While Iran cannot return to the past, it also cannot advance very rapidly. There has been little investment outside of oil; and any future development in this direction would devastate a social system in which millions of shopkeepers and government officials live on the proceeds of oil, while the rich invest their take in Swiss banks, German industry, and American real estate. The current state of the world economy is unpropitious for development attempts by a country with a backward, dependent economy, forced to import most of its food and all its technology, and already deeply in debt. While private enterprises can hardly make much of a dent, therefore, in the four millions of unemployed (about half the working population) produced by the Shah's modernization, state capitalism is not a likely option either, as the White Revolution has produced a sizable bourgeoisie with much to lose by such a turn of affairs. Despite the dreams of a golden age that accompany every revolution, the overthrow of the Shah can only be the prelude to a history of continuing social turmoil.

Babak Veramini

United Press International

Supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini guard Parliament Building in Teheran

Committees and Councils

The destruction of the Shah's state authority by the Iranian population was accompanied by the formation of new forms of political organization. From the beginning of the revolt to the downfall of the Bakhtiar government on 22 February, the only state organs that remained under the regime's control were the repressive organizations, such as the army and the police. The former bosses lost control of virtually all other institutions (banks, schools, ministries, state and private industries, television and radio, newspapers, etc.) in one of the longest general strikes in modern history. The breakdown of centralized power and the general revolutionary mood of the time provided the conditions for the emergence of local popular organizations. The main role of the hundreds of "committees" which sprang up spontaneously all over the country was to fulfill people's immediate needs and to facilitate the continuing struggle against the regime.

In the cities, district committees, using the mosques as meeting places, were to a large extent organized and operated by the local community without control by any particular political affiliations. In many places—notably in Meshed (the fourth largest city in Iran, with 800,000 inhabitants) and in many districts of Teheran—they were controlled by daily mass meetings. Parallel to these district committees, workers' and staff councils were formed in nearly all workplaces. By playing a decisive role in strikes and demonstrations, these councils assumed a clearly political character. The most prominent council was that of the oil workers, followed by those of bank employees and journalists. The struggle organized by these councils was so effective that no government could survive without their consent. It is no exaggeration to say that the councils and committees served as the main instruments of the popular struggle that brought down the Shah. They provided the basic organization for a total general strike: organized communications within the country while all radio, TV, and newspapers were shut down; organized the food supply and distribution of medicine, transforming public buildings and hotels into hospitals. Meshed was run by this form of organization for more than two weeks.

Once in power, the Islamic government had little difficulty in either dissolving or taking over the district committees. Already during the struggle national coordination had been provided by the network of mullahs, with their own political organization and aims. This was all the easier as the left had neither to offer. In addition, the religious structure had the advantages of a national symbol—Khomeini—something of importance in a backward country.

On the other hand, many workers' councils (and even occasional employees' councils), many of whom witnessed the open collaboration of the newly established power apparatus with the factory owners, put up resistance. As late as the end of May 1979 Bazargan was complaining of a certain factory committee's refusal to give up control over the plant. Khomeini has also made such complaints. In addition, many of the soldiers' councils which emerged toward the end of the struggle against the Shah, remain in opposition to the ongoing reestablishment of the military hierarchy.

We do not mean to contribute to a myth of "Iranian workers' councils." The organizations just briefly described did not represent an attempt to organize working-class power over society. What autonomous proletarian interests they did represent remained subordinated to the limited and even reactionary elements of the Iranian revolt. Nevertheless they bear witness to an important phenomenon. In Iran, a highly religious Islamic country, the working class played a key role in a popular movement of rebellion with a six-month general strike, organized in the absence of trade unions and powerful left parties, with a continuously high level of mass action and organization. This was made possible, as in revolutionary movements in more capitalistically developed countries, by the formation of workers' committees and councils, confirming once again that this is a "natural" organizational form for workers' struggle. Despite the limited content of their struggles, this form links the experience of the Iranian workers to the history of working-class movements. It is an experience which will gain new meaning when the struggle resumes on a new, more truly revolutionary basis.

The following translation of a leaflet issued by such a factory council may give some idea of the conceptions and activities of the workers in struggle—the most unknown element of the Iranian revolt, and the most significant for the future.

Babak Varamini

Proclamation of the Employees of the Navard Factories and Ahvaz Pipe (NFAP)
We Salute the Martyrs of People's Freedom!

The NFAP was established about nine years ago by Iranian and English capitalists at Kilometer 10 on the Ahvaz-Khoramshar road. An initial capital investment of 50 million tumans (about $7 million) has gradually about tripled. More than 900 of the 1200 personnel are workers. The principal stockholder (owning nearly 50 percent) is the Pahlevi Foundation, i.e., the former Shah. Minority investors include the Bank of Toesiah (Development), a British bank, and a number of Iranian capitalists. The factory produces six-inch-diameter light pipes and cables of different sizes. Until now, the firm's two main offices—one in Teheran, the other in England—have generally administered the factories and made all the major decisions.

The management's old British-style policy of concentrating production control in the hands of a select few has impeded the division of labor and in effect incurred an ever greater technological and economic dependence. This practice, coupled with that of appointing (until three years ago) only British presidents, has not only heavily damaged factory independence, but also resulted in enormous repression at all levels of the factory. All strikes and grievances were severely put down; activists were promptly fined and fired; several of their homes were set on fire; and some were beaten by thugs and sent to SAVAK.

To completely abolish the despotic system of the regime's corrupt, world-hungry, dependent capitalists, the Iranian

nation's bloody revolution had to cleanse the environment of agents of the former regime, including those who ordained oppression in the factory with the support of the regime's security forces. For this purpose, on the 28th Bahman 57 [18 February 1979] the factory employees decided to enact, to the best of their ability, self-rule over the fruits of their labor-power, that unique capital of laborers. The employees then gathered in front of the central factory buildings and elected eight people (four staff and four workers) to form a Transitional Revolutionary Committee. Having delegated them due authority, the employees resumed work that very day.

While declaring solidarity with the guidelines of the Iranian Revolution's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Transitional Revolutionary Committee at its first assembly resolved that:

1. Work would resume as before;
2. Managers tied to the former regime and responsible for repression would be dismissed immediately;
3. The employees themselves would administer the factories;
4. Foreigners would be expelled;
5. All those previously fired from the factories could return to their jobs.

That evening the employees' assembly approved all these proposals and returned to work. Confronted with their employees' determination, the management tried to invert facts in their distorted account of the situation presented to the Revolutionary Committee of the town of Ahvaz. They began to spread poison among the employees. To counter these anti-human actions, which were creating factions among the employees and could have stopped production, the employees of each part of the factory sent direct representatives to the district assemblies. Known as the Internal Workshop Committee, these 25 representatives set guidelines for the Transitional Revolutionary Committee, which eventually brought the firing of the most important pawns of the former regime and increased executive power for the employees. At present the committees have a two-to-one ratio of workers to staff. The workers' majority and their position on decisive resolutions have led to the success of the Transitional Committee. Of course the job is not yet completed, but this course will continue because decision-making has essentially passed into our hands. Having demonstrated our determination, we are sure we will be able to run the factory in the near future.

We ask all freedom fighters to help and support us financially, spiritually, and publicly so that our human objectives may become a lesson for other workers.

All power to the councils in factories, offices, districts, rural areas and cities!

Toward the establishment of unions and workers' political organizations!

NFAP Employees
[March 1979]

Associated Press

Supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini celebrating in Teheran after troops backing Prime Minister withdrew



CHINESE ROADS TO STATE CAPITALISM: Stalinism and Bukharinism in China's Industrial Revolution

Ten years ago, Western Maoists returned from Peking bursting with stories of daily life in revolutionary China. Inside the People's Republic, a second Chinese revolution was going on: ordinary peasants and workers were participating fully in making all of the decisions that affected their lives; women were rapidly advancing towards equality with men; leaders were no longer permitted to raise themselves above the masses and become a new ruling elite. In short, China was the first socialist country to solve the problem of post-revolutionary bureaucratization; such was the message delivered to us by dozens of travelers who had seen a future that worked.[1] That was a decade ago; today, the journey to the East is being made by another band of pilgrims inspired by an entirely different vision. Now it is the top executives of Western corporations—everyone from Pierre Cardin to David Rockefeller—who are crowding the hotels of Beijing; and, what they are searching for is not a new social order but the fabled China Market. (That capitalists have pursued this mirage for a century or more is, by the way, one of the eternal mysteries of the inscrutable Occidental mind.)

China's new hospitality towards the potentates of the multinationals is only one of the unpleasant surprises which the current leadership has sprung on its foreign admirers. The first shock was the purge and arrest of Mao's closest associates, including his widow, Jiang Qing, barely a month after his death. More recently, we have seen Deng Xiaoping attempt to teach the Vietnamese bureaucracy a lesson it failed to learn from Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. In between these two incidents, a series of other disillusioning events took place, such as China's scolding Jimmy Carter for letting the Shah topple from the Peacock Throne. The meaning of these events is gradually becoming a topic of debate within the American Left. Has the new regime betrayed the Maoist ideals of the Cultural Revolution and reverted to a "bourgeois" political line? Or has there been no essential departure from the policies laid down by Mao ten years ago, but merely a rectification of certain "excesses"?[2]

I do not propose here to choose a side in this polemic; far from it, what I want to show in these pages is that the argument is irrelevant because both sides proceed on the basis of false premises about the nature of Maoism. The common understanding on the Left of the political conflicts within the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] is mistaken: the "left-wing way out of Stalinism," which many see in Maoism, is a political mirage. There is as little reason—or less—to regret the defeat of the Maoist "Gang of Four" as there is to celebrate the victory of the "number-two person in power following the capitalist road" (as Deng was known during the Cultural Revolution). To demonstrate the validity of these judgments will require a close examination of Mao's socioeconomic policies and of the struggle within the Party bureaucracy.

Mao vs. Stalin?

Over the last decade a new consensus on the nature of Maoism and its relation to Stalinism has emerged among Western China-watchers. During the early 1950s, the story goes, the CCP uncritically imitated the Soviet political and econom-

ic system, with the result that Chinese society became increasingly hierarchical and authoritarian. Once Mao realized where the Soviet path was leading China, he rebelled and set out to find a new "Chinese road to socialism," more consistent with radical principles of egalitarianism and mass participation in decision-making. Mao devoted the last twenty years of his life to the struggle—against stubborn opposition from a conservative Party bureaucracy intent on retaining its power and privileges—to subordinate China's economic development to socialist values of equality and democracy.

Stalinist economic theory had insisted that nationalization plus economic growth would automatically lead to a classless society: no need to be concerned, then, if in the meantime gross inequalities persisted; if all decisions were made by a handful of bureaucrats, with no mass participation; if the countryside were drained of resources to support urban industrialization. But all of these phenomena were unacceptable to Mao, and he reacted strongly against their appearance in China during its First Five-Year Plan [FYP]. The transition to communism, he insisted, must begin without delay; it must not be put off till the indefinite future on the grounds that the material preconditions were lacking. To meet this goal he devised a new approach to the problems of economic growth. The peasants would not be left to stagnate while cities flourished at their expense; rural industry would be developed along with its urban counterpart, and at an even faster rate, so that the gap between town and country would narrow and eventually disappear. The incomes of the bureaucrats would not be permitted to grow, and they would be encouraged to restrict their consumption and required to participate in physical labor alongside the workers and peasants, so as not to become separated from the masses. The masses would be drawn into the decision-making processes in factories and villages. The health and education systems would be redesigned to provide services for everyone, not just for the privileged few. The arts would focus on the lives of workers and peasants and their struggle to become better socialists, rather than glamorizing the ruling classes, old or new. Step by step, the class distinctions which still survived under socialism would be reduced and ultimately abolished: so Maoist economics is usually presented.[3]

Thus Maoism represents a total break with the economic and political doctrines of Stalinism: this view has become part of the conventional wisdom of current China scholarship, and is shared by writers of almost every political position. To be sure, there are differences of interpretation or emphasis; radical scholars, for example, describe Mao as the leader of a coalition of workers and poor peasants in a "class struggle" against the would-be new ruling-class and its allies, while liberal academics portray him as a visionary, a man in revolt against the canons of Weberian bureaucratic rationality, striving futilely to keep the spirit of revolution alive. Although liberals and radicals disagree on the feasibility of Mao's goal, and whether it was shared by the majority or imposed from above, there is no disagreement over the nature of his goal: to immediately begin the transition to communist social relations.

It is this consensus which I would like to call into question. China's political struggle of the last twenty-five years should not be seen as a confrontation between a Stalinist orthodoxy which dictates economic development at any cost and a Maoist alternative which places human values above economics. Rather, the split within the Chinese ruling class has centered on a more mundane topic, the optimal rate of economic growth, and has juxtaposed two conflicting development strategies—one, advocated by Mao Zedong, being fast but risky; the other, proposed by "Capitalist-roaders" like Deng Xiaoping, slower but more dependable. No one would deny that "moderates" like Deng have been primarily concerned with economic growth; I will try to show that the same is true of the Maoist faction, despite its facade of populist and egalitarian rhetoric. Furthermore, I will argue, it was not Mao who renounced Stalin's economic priorities, but his opponents; Mao wanted to retain the essential features of the Stalinist development program, making only such changes as were needed to adapt the Soviet model to Chinese economic realities. In order to demonstrate this, it will be necessary to return to the origins of the "struggle between the two lines" in the 1950s, for it was then that the economic battle lines between "left" and "right" were drawn. The bulk of this article will recount, in some detail, the emergence of the conflict during the 1950s; I will then attempt, more briefly, to show that the same issues continued to be the focus of debate in the 1960s and 1970s. But first we must clarify the meaning of the key term, "Stalinist development strategy," so as to avoid certain confusions which have become endemic to recent China scholarship.

The Stalinist Development Strategy

Throughout these pages, I will be using such terms as "Stalinist model" and "Stalinist development strategy" in a very specific and restricted sense, referring to the set of interrelated policies applied during the USSR's First Five-Year Plan. The later Five-Year Plans have, of course, much in common with the first, but it was the economic program of 1929-32 which embodied the principles of Stalinist economics in their purest form. The following decades saw a gradual drift away from the pure Stalinist model, in a direction which might be called (the term will be explained presently) Bukharinist. It is customary, at least in writing about China, to include the entire history of Soviet economic policy under the rubric of "the Soviet model," a term used interchangeably with "Stalinist model." Although this broader definition is perfectly appropriate for most purposes, the failure to differentiate between variations of Soviet economics has contributed (as will become clear in due course) to the general confusion about the relationship between Maoism and Stalinism.

Stalin's First Five-Year Plan was, in a phrase, a crash industrialization program.[4] All efforts were concentrated on a single goal: the highest possible rate of growth of heavy industry. The State took control of the entire urban economy, and scarce resources were channeled into the priority sectors, at the expense of consumer goods industries; centralized planning was introduced and expanded precisely to ensure the "correct" distribution of resources, as market forces would otherwise dictate investment in the higher-profit consumer sector. Attempts were periodically made to raise labor productivity by speed-ups and forced overtime, with disastrous consequences for workers' health and safety. While production quotas were raised through "socialist emulation," living standards were on the decline as consumer industries were starved of investment. Police informers in the factories recorded the workers' response to this intensified exploitation: "Socialist competition is a new yoke on the neck of the workers. They want to drive

the half-dead worker to the grave before his time."[5]

Agriculture made a major contribution to the growth of heavy industry; the countryside provided a pool of cheap labor, which could be transferred to the cities as needed, and the peasants' labor provided food and raw materials for the consumer industries, which provisioned the growing urban workforce, as well as agricultural exports, which were exchanged for Western capital goods. To give the peasants something in return, more consumer goods or agricultural tools, would have drawn resources away from heavy industry; thus, the agricultural surplus product was extracted without offering anything in exchange. Forced "collectivization,"[6] which amounted to a war waged by the ruling class against the peasantry, gave the State control over the peasants' land and labor-power, making it possible to extract the agricultural surplus relatively efficiently. One effect of this policy—which, as we will see, made the Stalinist model unworkable in China—was a long-term stagnation of agricultural output, for the peasants had little incentive to produce more.

These are the main features of the Stalinist strategy. In the late 1920s the "Bolshevik Right," led by Nikolai Bukharin, charted a different path to industrialization.[7] Their main disagreement with the "Left" was over agricultural policy. Remembering the 1920-21 rural uprisings that had been provoked by wartime grain requisitioning, Bukharin feared that a renewed assault on the peasants would drive them to rebel again. Instead, they should be persuaded to hand over their crop surpluses by offering them farm tools and consumer goods in exchange. Industry should therefore be oriented towards serving the needs of agriculture. Heavy industry's growth would necessarily be slower in the short run, but it would eventually benefit from the larger surpluses created by agricultural investment. In this strategy, the flow of resources from country to city would be maintained (by taxation and by manipulation of the ratio between the prices of industrial and agricultural goods), but at a slower pace, so as not to antagonize the peasants. Compulsory collectivization was ruled out. Since investment would not be forced into heavy industry, there would be no need to immediately substitute planning for the market; instead of subsidizing heavy industry, all State industry would be required to operate at a profit.

These are the poles between which state-capitalist economic policy oscillates: when the bureaucracy becomes disillusioned with the extreme form of the Stalinist model, it has nowhere to go but to the "Right," that is, towards the Bukharinist model. Nikolai Bukharin is thus the patron saint of all state-capitalist "economic reformers," even if they do not always remember to light a candle at his altar. Examples of pure Stalinist economics are rare: the USSR during the First FYP; most of Eastern Europe in the early Cold War years; China in 1953-54 and again during the Great Leap Forward. Yugoslavia has moved the farthest in the other direction, but it is not entirely alone; to one degree or another, concessions to the Bukharinist strategy (or, as it is more often known, "market socialism") are the general rule. In the People's Republic, Bukharinist tendencies were kept in check by Mao, but have flourished since his death.

"Learn from the Soviet Union"

By maximizing the rate of exploitation and concentrating all resources on a single goal, Stalin's crash industrialization program did succeed in achieving that goal: heavy industry advanced rapidly. Steel production, for example, increased by 48 percent during the first plan; oil, by 83 percent. It was this success story which the Chinese were to try to emulate in their own First Five-Year Plan, begun in 1953. However, China adopted the Stalinist development model at a time when it was already beginning to come into question throughout the state-capitalist bloc, including the Soviet Union itself. Stalin's death in March 1953 made it possible to criticize his economics; by September, Khrushchev had described in the pages of *Pravda* the failure of Soviet agriculture under Stalin: grain output, he revealed, had increased by only 10 percent since 1940, and there were fewer livestock than there had been forty years before. Malenkov proposed an economic "New Course," which would increase investment in light industry and agriculture. Throughout Eastern Europe, the Stalinist pattern of crash industrialization, which had been applied from 1949 to 1953, was being reconsidered.[8] The CCP leaders were not insulated from Soviet and Eastern European influences; their readiness to back down from the classic Stalinist model when it foundered in China was no doubt encouraged by the "rightward" trend within the bloc.

It was on the "industrial front" that the People's Republic most closely followed the Stalinist line. State investment was, if anything, even more heavily concentrated in industry, with other sectors, such as agriculture and housing, receiving an even smaller share of the pie.[9] The Soviet practice of setting targets too high to be met was also followed: the yearly plan for 1953 called for a 25.6 percent rise in industrial output, to be achieved mostly through a 16 percent increase in labor productivity; but, despite a nationwide speed-up drive, these targets could not be met.[10] Speed-ups occurred in the first half of the year in both 1953 and 1954; their impact on the workers was occasionally disclosed by the Party press. The *People's Daily* acknowledged that industrial accidents were up in the first half of 1953. The following year, a report from Shanghai said that, "In transport departments, many accidents have been caused as a result of overburdening the workers. The carrying of excessively heavy loads has caused the workers to vomit blood, to complain of aching bones, to suffer injuries from falls, and to hurt their spines." Early in 1955, when the Stalinist model was under attack, the head of the "Trade Unions" declared, "There has been no limit to the prolongation of working hours; individual workers have worked continuously

for 72 hours through additional shifts and working hours.... There are quite a few cases in which, owing to exhaustion, workers have fainted, vomitted blood, or even died."[11]

Along with the speed-ups went an intensification of repression directed against the workers. The official press mounted a campaign to tighten labor discipline in the spring of 1953. Workers were denounced for such crimes as skipping work to go to the movies, or to work for private capitalists who paid higher wages than the State. "In the Shanghai Electric Bulb Factory," one typical attack ran, "where the working hours terminate at 5 PM, many workers go to the toilet room at around 4:50 PM to wash their hands and get ready to leave. ... The workers eat candies and watermelon seeds, talk and laugh just as if they are attending a tea party."[12] The next year, the campaign was resumed: a labor discpline code, copied directly from Stalin, was introduced, and special tribunals were set up in the industrial districts and along the railroad lines to try "saboteurs."[13] The consequences of these discipline campaigns were described—again, in 1955—in an editorial in the Beijing *Workers' Daily*:[14]

> Inadequate business management, low productivity, and failure to complete the production plans are all blamed on the workers and ascribed to their breach of labor discipline. ... The management of some enterprises often shift the responsibility for injury and accidents to the workers... For instance, the grinder on the "chlorine trough" in Workshop 52 of the Shenyang Chemical Works has no safety equipment. The workers had pointed this out but the workshop took no action, with the result that an accident occurred where a worker had his fingers cut. Analyzing the causes for the accident, the man in charge of the workshop put it "carelessness on the part of workers." ... The worker who had lost his fingers was fined one month's bonus and made to criticize himself before the public. In other instances, when a serious loss has resulted to an enterprise due to an accident, the worker responsible is sent to the people's court to be punished as a criminal.

The author of this editorial was attacked during Mao's Great Leap Forward as a "bourgeois rightist"; this and other examples of muckraking were among the "crimes" against the proletariat for which he was condemned.

In agriculture, the Stalinist path was followed much more hesitantly and cautiously.[15] As originally envisioned, collectivization was to take place in three stages, spread out over a period of about fifteen years. The process would begin with the formation of mutual aid teams—each composed of five to twenty households—which would systematize and extend the traditional pooling of labor, tools, and animals without making any changes in property relations. In the second stage, several teams would be united in a cooperative, in which work would be organized collectively but the peasants would retain title to their land, and would be paid partly according to the amount and quality of the land they contributed. Finally, the cooperatives were to be amalgamated into collectives—each the size of a large village, or about a hundred families—in which land, large tools, and draft animals would be owned "in common" and payment would depend solely on labor.

By the middle of 1952, some 40 percent of peasant households, most of them in the "early liberated areas" of North and Northeast China, had joined mutual aid teams; only a handful (0.1 percent) were in cooperatives. The first serious attempt to organize cooperatives occurred in the spring of 1953 (roughly coinciding with that year's industrial speed-up), and was preceded by a purge of around 10 percent of the rural cadres. This mini-collectivization drive reached its peak in March, and was then reversed: 29 percent of the cooperatives were disbanded, and the cadres were criticized for the "brutal measures" they had used in forcing the peasants to sign up. While the number of cooperatives doubled, it still remained insignificant. Although this first experiment was not very successful, the imperatives of rapid industrialization demanded that the bureaucracy gain more control over agriculture, all the more so when a new trade agreement with the USSR, requiring more agricultural exports, was signed in the fall.

Since the peasants had proven unwilling to hand over their produce to the State at below-market prices, a new law was enacted in November 1953: henceforth, all "excess" grain would be bought at prices set by the State. "If socialism does not occupy the rural front line then capitalism will," Mao declared, and there was a new push to organize the peasants. By mid-1954, some 60 percent were organized, but still mostly in mutual-aid teams; only 2 percent belonged to cooperatives. From fall 1954 to spring 1955, the campaign was resumed, and the proportion of rural households in cooperatives increased to 14 percent. The number of collectives was miniscule. There was a long way to go to full collectivization, or so it seemed.



The Stalinist model in crisis

Difficulties with the First Five-Year Plan arose immediately. The industrial speed-ups necessary to meet over-ambitious targets led not only to more accidents, but also to more breakdowns of expensive machinery and a general deterioration of product quality, to the point that much of the increased output was unusable. Concentrating investment in capital-intensive heavy industry provided few new jobs, and thus offered little hope to the millions of urban unemployed. Shortages of food and consumer goods and wretched housing conditions added to the demoralization of the urban workforce. Even more serious were the rural problems. Many peasants were unhappy about being forced into cooperatives; they responded by killing off draft animals and pigs, breaking tools, and refusing to obey work orders.[16] Peasant resistance was not as widespread as in Stalin's collectivization drives,[17] but it was serious enough to make the Party think twice about pushing the peasants too hard. With the introduction of compulsory grain purchases, the surplus product extracted from the countryside was at once increased sharply—and this

despite poor harvests in 1953-54—leaving some peasants with barely enough to eat. The high procurement quotas set off a panic in the countryside in 1954-55: peasants concealed grain from the authorities, besieged them with complaints and demands for a return of the surpluses already handed in, and fled to the cities in droves; rural Party cadres often participated in these activities or looked the other way.[18]

Similar difficulties at the start of the USSR's First Plan had not forced Stalin into any major reconsideration of his development program; in fact, he had insisted on stepping up the pace of industrialization and completing the Five-Year Plan in four years. But the CCP faced still another problem, one which could not be ignored: the increase in output expected to result from more rational and efficient organization of agricultural labor did not materialize. While industry was forging ahead, agriculture fell short of the plan targets, and in fact barely kept pace with population growth. Since the countryside provided 90 percent of the raw materials for light industry and 75 percent of the exports exchanged for foreign capital goods, the agricultural lag had an immediate effect on industry.[19] After the excellent harvest of 1952, industry's growth rate in the following year was 30 percent, but with the poor harvests of 1953 and 1954, industrial growth fell to 16 percent in 1954 and 6 percent in 1955.[20] No such dependence of industrial growth on agricultural fluctuations occurred in the Soviet Union: on the contrary, while total agricultural production fell by 25 to 30 percent over the course of the First Five-Year Plan, State procurements more than doubled, allowing industry to expand steadily.[21]

Unlike the Soviet Union, the People's Republic was unable to consistently extract an agricultural surplus large enough to maintain rapid industrial growth. The reason lay in a fundamental difference between the China of the 1950s and the Russia of the 1920s, a difference which was to make the Stalinist model unworkable in China. In the Soviet Union, it was possible to offset a poor harvest by decreasing the peasants' consumption; State procurements did not have to be lowered. But China's peasants lived too close to subsistence level to permit any cut in living standards: China's per capita grain production in 1952 was not quite 60 percent of the USSR's in 1928.[22] Not only was China's potential agricultural surplus so small that a bad harvest could virtually wipe it out, but also any attempt to preserve the surplus at the expense of consumption would court disaster. To persist in squeezing grain out of the peasants after a crop failure would drive them to the wall, and they would retaliate by slaughtering draft animals and destroying tools, which in turn would further reduce production in the following years. This meant that a fundamental departure from Stalinist orthodoxy was essential. While the Soviet bureaucracy could afford to let total farm output stagnate, since it could in any case lay its hands on a sizable surplus, in China an increase in total output was necessary to guarantee a reliable surplus. A purely extractive, Stalinist approach was thus not feasible.

With the Five-Year Plan in trouble after only two years, the CCP had to begin to recognize that a quick push for heavy industry was impractical. In fact, opposition to the Plan's basic strategy had already been voiced in 1953, when unnamed critics were officially quoted as demanding more investment in light industry and agriculture and a rise in living standards.[23] By early 1955, it seems that most of the top bureaucrats had come to accept the (essentially Bukharinist) logic of the critics' position. In the vanguard in developing a new policy was a group of economic experts within the Party, Chen Yun being a notable example, but the turn to the "right" apparently enjoyed wide support at the highest level of the apparatus. As a result, there was a general retreat from the Stalinist line of 1953-54.

The collectivization drive which had started in the fall of 1954 was halted, about 3 percent of the cooperatives were allowed to dissolve, and the rural cadres were again criticized for their use of economic pressure (i.e., raising the taxes of those who refused to join co-ops) or physical coercion. In the future, it was stressed, collectivization would be purely voluntary, and a low rate of formation of co-ops was projected for 1955. The burden of State procurement quotas was lightened, and the peasants were promised that there would be no increase in quotas for three years. The terms of trade were to be somewhat less unfavorable to the countryside. In industry, the speed-ups were denounced as "guerilla methods," inapplicable to modern industry; trade union cadres were criticized for having shown a lack of concern for the welfare of the workers. Light industry was to receive a greater share of investment, providing more consumer goods for workers and peasants. The policy of social peace was even extended to the capitalists: fearing a capital strike provoked by rumors of imminent nationalization, the Party relaxed its control over business transactions, returned a few shops that had been nationalized in 1954-55 to their original owners, and reassured capitalists that they would continue to play a major role in the economy.[24]

It is not clear how far China's Bukharinists had progressed in working out the particulars of a long-run solution to the main problem: the unreliability of the agricultural surplus. Investment in agriculture was part of their program, but what kind of investment? Tractors were clearly not the answer: they could not yet be produced in the required numbers, and the available models were not suited to most of China's agriculture. In the event the "Right" was not in a position to work out a full solution in practice until the early 1960s; but the general direction to be taken must already have been obvious in 1955: increased application of fertilizers, expansion of the amount of land under irrigation, etc. Whether the Party would have been willing in the mid-1950s to accept the large shift of investment funds required to make such a program work will never be known; but, in the long run they were to have little choice. Meanwhile, Mao thought he had a better idea.

Mao's neo-Stalinist alternative

The most obvious drawback of the slow-growth strategy, from the point of view of the bureaucracy, was that it implied a long period of dependence on Soviet economic aid: if the emphasis was to be shifted to light industry and agriculture, the building of an independent heavy-industrial base would have to be delayed and capital goods would have to be imported for years to come. The Russians would certainly try to parlay their economic leverage into political control. This prospect could not have been pleasing to Mao, who had once told Edgar Snow, "We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow!"[25] In addition, the Bukharinist strategy would postpone the day when China would join the front ranks of world powers, and

this must have been equally displeasing to Mao, who repeatedly stated that, "We must . . . build our country up into a powerful modern socialist state" and "We shall catch up with Britain in fifteen years."[26] Such nationalistic sentiments were, I would argue, the most important motive behind Mao's search for a developmental model that would salvage the prospect of rapid modernization. Three aspects of Mao's program will be examined here: its continuities with the original Stalinist model; its solution to the problem of the agricultural surplus; and its "egalitarianism."

(1) At the core of the Maoist program was the very same set of policies that were enacted in Stalin's First Five-Year Plan: immediate nationalization, industrial speed-up drives, collectivization of the peasants, general austerity. And these measures had the same overriding goal as in Stalin's program, the fastest possible development of heavy industry.

This point needs to be underlined: its full significance has not often been grasped. Thus, one noted scholar can write that "the Great Leap Forward marks the triumph of the Maoist approach over Soviet models," even though he recognizes that the Leap "does not mark a decisive break with one of the main features of the Stalinist model. . . . There was to be no diversion of investment inputs from the heavy industrial sector." This statement does not do justice to the continuities between Stalinist and Maoist economics; for, the exclusive focus on heavy industry, which Mao borrowed from the Soviet First Five-Year Plan, entailed more than merely "a Stalinist conception of capital allocation."[27] It also entailed a wide range of corollaries which touched the lives of every social group, from urban workers (the speed-ups) to the peasants (forced collectivization).

A number of additional similarities between Stalin's first plan and Mao's Great Leap Forward [GLF] might be noted: for instance, the continual raising of production quotas from the attainable to the implausible to the impossible, coupled with attacks (under the guise of "class struggle") on all those who questioned the targets; the proliferation of military terminology—the "production front," "battles" with nature, etc.—with its emphasis on discipline and self-sacrifice; the insistence that all art and literature must serve to indoctrinate the workers and peasants in this ethic of military discipline and self-immolation; and the use of a rhetoric of mass participation to disguise increased exploitation. This last is worthy of particular consideration, for Western Maoists claim that workers' participation in management was one of the points on which Mao departed from Stalinist orthodoxy. Yet, participatory rhetoric was just as much a part of Stalin's economics as of Mao's. Stalin's speed-ups were always officially described as products of the workers' spontaneous demands. We do not need to turn back to the Soviet propaganda of the 1930s to see this; contemporary Stalinists continue to make the same claim. Thus we hear that Stakhanovism "arose from the initiatives of individual workers themselves. . . . What in other countries has generally been devised by functional foremen and efficiency experts, often in the teeth of relentless hostility from ordinary workers, was now being initiated by workers themselves."[28] Another eulogist of Stalin's Russia speaks of "the participation of workers in criticizing the five-year plan and drawing up revised plans of their own."[29] In practice, talk of "mobilizing the masses" and "relying upon the creativity of the masses" has always signified a Stalinist-style crash industrialization, in China as much as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Pro-Maoist scholars point to the fact that Mao was a severe critic of Soviet economics, including Stalin's own writings.[30] What they overlook is that Mao's attacks were leveled at the (post-Stalinist) Soviet economic orthodoxy of the 1950s, and at Stalin only insofar as he moved away from the pure Stalinist model in his later writings. Mao's references to the Soviet First Five-Year Plan, though infrequent, are invariably favorable: "At that time [1928] Stalin had nothing else to rely upon except the masses, so he demanded all-out mobilization of the party and the masses. Afterward, when they had realized some gains this way, they became less reliant on the masses."[31] Mao's reproach to Stalin was, it seems, that he stopped being a good Stalinist. Nor was Mao too hard on China's economic planners for their emulation of the Stalinist model in their own First Five-Year Plan: in fact, he stated that the first plan, though it "lacked creativity," was "basically correct."[32] It was only when the planners questioned the cardinal Stalinist principle of priority to heavy industry that Mao balked. If many writers have missed the essential point—that Mao rejected the Soviet economic orthodoxy of the 1950s only in order to revive an earlier, and more repressive, Stalinist orthodoxy—this is at least partly because they fail to distinguish between variations of the Soviet model, and therefore assume that the rejection of one particular variant is equivalent to discarding Soviet economics as a whole.

(2) As we have seen, the fundamental weakness of the Chinese economy was agriculture's inability to consistently provide an adequate surplus product, which caused industrial growth to fluctuate from year to year and made long-term planning impossible. The precondition for steady and rapid industrial growth was thus an increase in farm production. The appropriate technical measures to be applied were fairly clear: wider irrigation and improved flood control, more fertilizers, some kind of mechanization, etc. Up to this point, China's "Left" and "Right" could agree. The disagreement arose over the question of how to reach the common goal.

The "rightist" approach—which did not fully emerge until the early 1960s—was to increase the share of central investment in agriculture, producing chemical fertilizers and pesticides, small pumps to mechanize irrigation, and other small machines such as garden tractors.[33] Obviously, investment would have to be diverted from heavy industry; moreover, the program could not be expected to accomplish any dramatic results in the immediate future, and therefore implied a lengthy delay in the industrial take-off. Mao's "Left" refused to accept any such postponement; they insisted that a plentiful agricultural surplus could be created almost overnight, and without a major diversion of central investment into agriculture.[34] Thus the basic principles of Stalinist crash modernization need not be discarded.

The key assumption of Mao's rural development program was that the technical transformation of agriculture could be achieved—at little or no cost to the State—by mobilizing un- and underemployed labor and economically marginal natural resources which would otherwise be unutilized. Large-scale labor mobilization projects were one pillar of the Maoist program: vast labor armies would be put to work building irrigation canals and dikes, collecting organic fertilizer, killing natural pests, etc. The second major motif in the "leftist" strategy was rural industrialization: small factories would be set up everywhere, financed by the local peasants; the best-known example being the backyard iron and steel furnaces of

1958. These local plants would produce mainly agricultural means of production, such as small tools and chemical fertilizers. It should be stressed that rural industrialization was not an end in itself, inspired by a vision of narrowing the gap between country and city, so much as a means of avoiding the transfer of central investment away from heavy industry. A third category of Maoist policies included several reforms of agricultural technique, such as closer planting and deeper plowing, which were universally popularized with little preliminary testing. All of these measures, taken together, were expected to produce fantastic increases in crop yields almost immediately. Since Mao's rural program had to accomplish something Stalin hadn't needed to do, namely to create a surplus product rather than merely extract an already-existing one, it was necessary to gain an even tighter control over the peasants' labor-power and means of production than Stalin had attempted: this, and not an ideological vision of communism, was the motive behind the People's Communes.

(3) It is the third aspect of the Maoist development strategy that has attracted the most attention from Western radicals: its relative egalitarianism. On this point, Mao certainly departed significantly from the Stalinist precedent; where Stalin imposed austerity only on the masses, Mao wanted to force the cadres to make sacrifices as well. Yet here, too, it can be argued that Mao only altered the Stalinist model in order to adapt it to the greater economic backwardness of China. The economic rationale of Mao's egalitarianism has in fact already been elaborated in some detail—not by Mao's detractors, but by his admirers, who aim to defend him against the charge of economic irrationality and utopianism.[35] It is often pointed out, by scholars sympathetic to Maoism, that restriction of the bureaucracy's consumption was necessary to prevent it from becoming a drain on investment. And making the cadres participate in physical labor served not only to ensure that they helped to earn their keep, but also to allow them to supervise the workers and peasants more closely.[36] Similarly, Mao's educational reforms were aimed at slashing expenses on elite universities and stressing vocational training geared to the immediate needs of industry. Even his rural health program can be explained as intended "not only to relieve the hardship of chronic and almost universal bad health, but to minimize the consequent inefficiencies so that the population [could] get as much effective working energy as is possible out of a relatively low calorie intake."[37] The Maoist emphasis on liberating women by drawing them into the labor force, likewise, was a corollary of the labor mobilization strategy, which required the largest possible workforce.[38] Once it is realized that there were practical economic reasons behind all of these "egalitarian" policies, however, there is no longer any need to assume that Mao was motivated by socialist values; thus, the defense of his economic rationality undermines the image of Mao as humanistic reformer.

The mini-Leap Forward of 1955-56

As we have seen, the top Party bureaucrats had become disillusioned with the Stalinist strategy by early 1955 and were moving, at least provisionally, to the "right." Mao did not accept their decision. After touring the provinces, presumably to drum up support for his program, he called a conference of provincial Party secretaries in July and demanded that they step up the rate of collectivization. By the time the Central Committee met in October, he was able to present his colleagues with a *fait accompli:* collectivization was well under way, and without the disruptions they had feared. Mao followed up this victory by proposing a Twelve-Year Agricultural Program, which included a further acceleration of collectivization and projected vast increases in output, to be achieved through the labor-mobilization techniques described above. The program was put into practice without waiting for ratification from the Politburo. The rural cadres' lack of enthusiasm for collectivization was remedied by a campaign against "hidden counterrevolutionaries"; a new category of labor camp—to which suspects could be deported without the formality of a trial—was created for the occasion. Late in the year, a new speed-up drive was initiated in China's factories. At the same time, the remnants of private industry were nationalized and a massive investment drive was launched.[39]

Within months, the modified Stalinst program had run into the same problems as the orthodox Stalinist model. The speed-ups had familiar results: poor quality products, machine breakdowns, accidents, and worker unrest. Over-investment gave rise to competition for scarce resources, and as usual it was light industry which was sacrified. Furthermore, the State bureaucracy had difficulties managing the factories which it had taken over without adequate preparation. In the countryside, the situation was no better. Many peasants, still resenting being forced into collectives, resisted in the usual ways. They had further grounds for complaint: Mao's rural development plan increased their workload and lowered their living standards by cutting into the time available for family handicraft production and cultivation of private plots. Perhaps the most serious problem—one which was to arise on a much wider scale in the Great Leap Forward—reflected a consistent flaw in Mao's approach to rural development: new tools and techniques were adopted indiscriminately. Perhaps the most notorious example was the two-wheel, two-blade plow, one of Mao's hobby-horses. Hundreds of thousands of the plows were built in 1955-56 and sold to peasants who sometimes had to be forced to buy them. As it turned out, most of them had to be scrapped because of technical difficulties: the plows were too heavy and sank into the mud, there were not enough draft animals to pull them, etc. Errors of this sort, combined with bad weather, produced a disappointing harvest in 1956.

Mao's crash industrialization program had to be abandoned. The speed-up drive was halted, wages were raised, and workers were promised that the urban housing shortage would be relieved. The percentage of investment in light industry was to be increased. Concessions were also made to the peasants: private plots were restored where they had been taken away, rural free markets were re-opened, and prices for some agricultural goods were increased. Mao's Twelve-Year Agricultural Program was shelved. Many of the cadres who had opposed collectivization were released from the camps and restored to their posts, while those who had carried out the Leap-Forward program too enthusiastically were criticized for "commandism." At the Eighth Party Congress in September, the talk was all of modest, realistic planning and balanced growth.

With his program in trouble, Mao wisely retreated—or was forced to retreat. At a Politburo meeting in April, he delivered a speech, "On the Ten Major Relationships," which incorporated many of the proposals of the Bukharinists. This speech has misled a number of scholars into concluding that Mao was himself a Bukharinist, or at least a critic of the Soviet heavy-industry-first strategy supposedly favored by his opponents.[40] But as we have seen, it was not Mao, but his opponents, who first questioned the priority of heavy industry; and Mao only adopted this position when his own policies had failed and were under attack as "adventurist." This suggests that Mao's April speech represented a public concession to his opponents, not a statement of his own views. And in fact, it has been recently disclosed that Mao did not write "On the Ten Major Relationships"; the main drafter was one of Mao's Bukharinist critics.[41] Only by ignoring these facts can one make a case that the "Ten Major Relationships" demonstrates that Mao rejected the Stalinist development model; yet, this speech is the most important piece of evidence for the claim that Mao advocated a more consumer- and agriculture-oriented development program. Clearly, the theory rests on a shaky foundation.

The Impact of the Hundred Flowers Movement

For a few weeks in the spring of 1957, at Mao's insistence and against the will of most of the Politburo, open criticism of the Party by non-members was permitted—indeed, demanded. In keeping with the standard interpretation of Mao as an opponent of bureaucratic oppression, this episode is usually seen as an attempt to make the Party more responsive to popular sentiment. However, there is another way of looking at the matter. In 1956-57, Mao was somewhat under a cloud; his policies had been rejected and his personality cult was being undermined (by, e.g., the removal of any reference to "Mao Zedong Thought" from the Party Constitution).[42] When outvoted in the Politburo, Mao often appealed to forces outside the Party's inner circle; sometimes—in the case of the 1955-56 collectivization drive, for example—he looked to other elements of the Party bureaucracy for support; sometimes he



sought allies outside the Party, the most spectacular case being the Cultural Revolution. The Hundred Flowers Campaign can be seen as yet another of Mao's attempts to pressure his colleagues into accepting his policies by manipulating social forces.

Perhaps, then, Mao hoped that if he encouraged people to criticize the Party's arrogance and elitism, they would respond by supporting his economic program. The appeals to speak out freely were particularly directed to the "bourgeois intelligentsia," and Mao may have felt that their patriotic desire to see China become a world power would lead them to back his crash industrialization plan. If he had any such hopes, they were unfounded. Popular criticism went beyond attacks on individual cadres—which would have been acceptable—to question basic Party policy and even the Party's right to exercise dictatorship. Not all of the dissenters were conservatives or liberals; some of the attacks on Party rule came from a left-wing perspective. One student from a poor peasant background asserted that "a new class oppression" had emerged: "As for the means of production, the main Party, Government, and Army people, who hold power and represent a very small percentage of the people, own them in common and embellish this situation by calling it 'common ownership by the people.'"[43] The greatest ferment occurred on the campuses, but it was not only students who raised inexpedient demands. Union functionaries, for example, called for the right to organize unions free of Party control, and shop-floor representatives complained that they were required to "unconditionally support the management." If they objected to increased quotas and forced overtime, they would be accused of such deviations as "syndicalism" and "economism." "Some even accuse trade-union cadres of 'unprincipled compromise' with the masses."[44]

Faced with vehement attacks, including calls for the overthrow of Party dictatorship, the CCP put a quick end to the free speech movement and counterattacked with an "anti-rightist" campaign. Apparently, Mao had suffered another setback; not only had he failed to garner support for his economic projects, but he had provoked the resentment of Party members by forcing them to submit to outsiders' bitter denunciations. The Party, it seems, took a subtle revenge: quite a bit of personal invective against Mao was published in the official press, under the pretext of reporting the evil sayings of "bourgeois rightists."[45] Yet less than six months later, Mao was able to revive his Leap-Forward policies of 1955-56 on a much larger scale over the continuing opposition, or at least skepticism, of a large part of the top Party leadership. How did Mao transform apparent defeat into victory?

One factor in Mao's success was his manipulation of the tensions between provincial and central Party bureaucrats. The slowdown in growth, which the Bukharinists were prepared to accept, would leave the more underdeveloped provinces stranded in their backwardness for an indefinite period. At the Eighth Party Congress, several provincial Party secretaries asked the central leadership for more industrial investment.[46] It was Mao who answered their request, for one of the provisions of the GLF was that each province would have its own heavy-industrial base.[47] Those provincial Party bosses who backed Mao's call for a new Leap Forward were rewarded with promotions to the Central Committee in 1958.[48]

While support from the provinces was important to Mao, the strongest impetus to the revival of his neo-Stalinist program was no doubt the fact that the "right" turn of 1956-57 was not having the desired results.[49] Despite concessions to the agricultural producers, the performance of that key sector did not improve. Rural cadres, under less pressure from above in the last half of 1956, set lower quotas for the collective fields and reduced local investment. Mediocre weather also had its effect, and State grain procurements after the summer 1957 harvest fell short of the official quota.

Furthermore, even before the Hundred Flowers Movement, the general relaxation of controls was threatening to get out of hand. Thousands of peasants deserted the collectives in late 1956, and not all could be persuaded to return; and those who remained within the collective farm system often collaborated with the local cadres in undermining it. The officially-sanctioned expansion of private plots also undercut the peasants' obligations to the State and reinforced their tendency to devote more labor-time and apply more organic fertilizer to their own land than to the collective fields. In the cities, workers reacted to the Party's vacillations of mid-1956 by staging dozens of strikes in the latter part of the year and the first half of 1957.[50] Thus workers and peasants responded to the Party's conciliatory gestures of 1956-57, not by working harder to achieve new economic successes, but rather by airing old grievances and pushing for further concessions. Politically, as well as economically, it seemed that the right turn was leading to a dead end. It is not surprising, then, that the Party was amenable to being persuaded to change courses once more—especially since the repressiveness of the Stalinist program suited the bureaucracy's defensive and retaliatory mood after the Hundred Flowers. Furthermore, a good deal of China's social unrest was directly attributable to economic stagnation; in this light, a crash program may have seemed the most plausible way out of a potentially dangerous situation.

The Great Leap Forward

In response to the popular unrest revealed by the Hundred Flowers, the poor performance of the economy in 1956-57, and the threatened loss of control over the peasants, the Party was already moving in a "leftist" (i.e., Stalinist) direction by the middle of 1957. After the summer harvest, a "socialist education campaign" was launched; its aim in the rural areas was to persuade the peasants to return to the collec-

tives and to spend more time working the collective fields.[51] Opponents of collectivization—rich peasants and ex-landlords, according to official accounts—were punished as examples to the rest. Rural markets were closed down, in order to discourage the peasants from private labor. In the cities, the rebellious mood of the workers and students was met by repression. "Counter-Revolutionary Cases Involving Posting of Reactionary Slogans Broken in Liaoning Province," ran a typical headline of the period. One of the counterrevolutionaries, a worker in an auto plant, "had on many occasions scribbled reactionary slogans and distributed reactionary handbills. On 18 and 20 April, he distributed in a streetcar reactionary handbills slandering the leadership and inciting workers to stage strikes." Another article described a group of "undesirable characters" recently taken into custody; among them were workers who "constantly violated labor discipline. They absented themselves from work without giving reasons, adopted the passive attitude of going slow with work, were insubordinate to the leadership, refused to take up the work assigned to them, and even went so far as to snap at the leadership and to sabotage means of production and state property."[52] This repression directed against even the slightest hint of worker resistance is not easy to reconcile with the claim that an "unprecedented experiment in worker control and participation in management swept over the nation" during the GLF.[53]

It was in this general atmosphere—a closing of Party ranks against outside criticism, a tightening of control over the masses—that the first clear signs of a return to the Maoist strategy appeared.[54] A revised version of Mao's Twelve-Year Agricultural Program was on the agenda at the fall Central Committee meeting, and several of the slogans of the mini-Leap Forward were heard again. "Socialist education" in the countryside was intensified; now the main target was the "rightist conservatism" of the lower-level cadres, who had complained that the Party was squeezing too much grain out of the peasants and driving them to rebel. Some 3 percent of the basic-level cadres were purged. Hundreds of thousands of urban bureaucrats—"conservatives" who doubted the wisdom of the Party's turn to the "left"—were criticized and sent down to work in factories and villages; they could redeem themselves by helping to strengthen the management of collectives and factories.

Throughout this period, from the summer of 1957 to the early fall of 1958, Mao was extremely active, touring the provinces time and again, no doubt to canvass support for the GLF. In November, he went to Moscow in search of economic aid, the last of China's Soviet credits having been exhausted; he returned to Beijing with empty pockets. It was clear that China would have to develop solely through its own efforts; this may have provided Mao with the clinching argument for mounting a new crash-industrialization drive. At any rate, it was only after Mao's return from Moscow that the Great Leap Forward really got under way. Over the winter of 1957-58, tens of millions of peasants were drafted into labor armies and put to work, almost bare-handed, on irrigation and flood control projects, fertilizer collection, pest control and land reclamation. Many of these undertakings, requiring more laborers than a single collective could spare, could only be organized through the joint efforts of several collectives; it was already becoming evident that the Maoist development strategy would require a higher level of collectivization.

In industry, the Leap Forward was slower in starting. At the turn of the year, an austerity program (a "rational low-wage system," in the official terminology) was introduced; apprentices were especially hard hit, their wages being slashed to subsistence level. In February 1958, production quotas were raised; throughout the rest of the year, quotas were raised again and again. Workshifts of 24 to 48 hours were not uncommon. Workers were so enthusiastic about the GLF, it was reported, that some refused to leave their factories for days on end; they slept and took their meals in the workshops. (Similar accounts were heard from the countryside: peasants were sleeping in their fields, so as not to waste time traveling between work and home.) The factory trials of "saboteurs" and "rightists" continued, and the purges within the bureaucracy extended to include union functionaries who had been too quick, in 1955 and 1957, to expose the impact of speed-ups on workers.[55] The chairman of the State Economic Commission announced that safety inspectors should not take a "one-sided" view in favor of safety at the expense of production.[56]

While the industrial Leap Forward was gathering momentum, more elements of the Maoist agricultural program were introduced, including the building of small factories and the reform of techniques, such as closer planting. In July/August, Mao proposed the creation of a super-collective, the People's Commune, which would give the State greater control over the peasants' labor-power and means of production. As in 1955-56, the new upsurge of collectivization was initiated by Mao and only ratified by the Politburo after the movement was under way.

The outstanding feature of the Communes was the vast amount of labor they mobilized. Everyone worked longer and harder, often to the point of exhaustion. Officials at the Commune level could draft peasants at will to work in factories or labor-intensive projects. With most of the men thus occupied, women replaced them in the fields; public mess halls and nurseries supplanted the women's traditional domestic labor. Private plots and household production were abolished; all of the peasants' labor-time was to be at the State's disposal. The peasants were motivated to join the Communes, it has been argued, by the offer of generous grain rations, made possible by the excellent summer harvest. This sounds plausible enough; but, if there was any such increase of rations, it must have been very short-lived, for once the Communes were established the emphasis shifted to austerity. Before the Leap Forward, some 90 percent of each harvest was distributed among the peasants. In the People's Communes, the official norm was 60 percent for consumption, 40 percent for reserves and accumulation; and some Communes reported that they had distributed only 30 percent to the peasants.[57] Even taking account of the exceptional harvest of 1958 (25 percent above the 1957 level, according to official statistics; 11 percent according to Western economists), it seems clear enough that living standards must have declined for most peasants, though some few may have gained from the general leveling of incomes. Maximization of the rate of exploitation of the peasantry was evidently the *raison d'etre* of the People's Communes.

Communization marked the high point of the Leap Forward; within a few months, the Party had already begun to retreat. Provincial tours by top bureaucrats in November and December revealed widespread peasant discontent over low rations, too much work and the authoritarian methods of the

rural cadres. At year's end, there was a campaign to "tidy up" the Communes. A Central Committee directive declared that peasants (and urban workers) must be allowed eight hours' sleep and four hours for rest and meals every day, women must not be required to do heavy work immediately before or after giving birth, and the armed rural militia must not be used to "impair. . . democratic life in the communes."[58] Sideline production was again legalized. The campaign to build small iron- and steel-plants throughout the Communes and cities was halted, as most of the output of the backyard furnaces was unusable.

The retreat from the GLF continued into 1959. The situation in industry was chaotic: shortages of raw materials, machine breakdowns, deterioration of product quality, and mounting accident rates. The pace had to be slowed; central planning had to be restored. The rural masses were still restive; cadres and peasants conspired to hide grain from higher authorities. A first step towards the dismantling of the Communes was decided upon that spring: the production brigade (that is, the old collective) was to be the basic unit of ownership, management, and distribution. The Communes would no longer draft labor from the brigades, nor would incomes be equalized among brigades. But before the new policy could be carried out, the tide of Chinese politics turned once more.

The occasion was a frontal attack on Mao's policies by the Minister of Defense, Peng Dehuai, who castigated the GLF as "petty-bourgeois fanaticism." Peng's challenge to Mao raised the spector of a military threat to Party supremacy; he was also too close to Khrushchev to escape the suspicion that he was being used by the Russians. Hence the top bureaucrats either rallied around the Chairman or kept silent. Peng's defeat was followed, in the fall of 1959, by a new attack on "rightist tendencies," aimed at those who criticized the Leap Forward or questioned the Party's leadership. Winter 1959-spring 1960 saw a revival, though on a smaller scale, of the GLF.

But the abandonment of the Maoist strategy could not be delayed indefinitely; exceptionally bad weather in 1959-61, combined with the irrationalities of the Leap itself, led to a severe food crisis. At the depth of the crisis,, malnutrition was widespread, and there were famines in some of the more backward areas; in some parts of the country, hunger drove the peasants into sporadic armed revolts, which were put down by the People's Liberation Army.[59] Mass starvation was only avoided by huge grain imports.

Food shortages and growing unrest required that Mao's experiment in crash industrialization be discontinued. By the middle of 1960, it was obvious that the Party's first priority must be to restore agricultural production, no matter how many concessions it might have to make to the peasants. Late in the year, the decision to transfer power down to the brigades was finally implemented. Private plots, sideline production and rural markets were restored. The peasants were allowed to keep 92 to 94 percent of the harvest. Most of the small plants were shut down, and the labor armies were disbanded. The peasants were encouraged to vent their rage upon their local leaders, who were criticized for "commandist" behavior (including murder and torture) during the organization of the Communes.[60] These measures were not enough to restore the peasants' confidence in the Party, and a year later more concessions followed. Decision-making power was now shifted down to the level of the production team (corresponding to the old cooperative). In practice, the Party had to go even farther in yielding to the "spontaneous capitalist tendencies" of the peasantry. The collective-farming system was eroded in a variety of ways: the size of the private plots was increased; peasants were allowed to keep land they cleared by themselves; collective land was rented to peasant households; and team cadres often contracted out work to the individual households, thereby restoring private ownership in all but

name. These steps were not taken to the same extent in every locality, but in some provinces, half or more of the arable land was under private ownership or cultivation by early 1962.

A general retreat from the Maoist/Stalinist development model was, then, the order of the day. If this had been merely an emergency program, to be followed by a return to the GLF, Mao would have had little to complain about; indeed, he himself vigorously participated in the attacks on lower-level cadres for their "leftist excesses" (that is, for carrying out his own orders too enthusiastically). But what the Party bureaucracy had in mind was more than a temporary retreat; in the mid-1960s they worked out their own alternative to Mao's neo-Stalinist strategy.

China's NEP and the Maoist Resurgence

The collapse of the GLF opened up a new period, which has been aptly titled "China's New Economic Policy," by analogy with the Soviet retreat from the "leftism" of War Communism.[61] Out of the immediate response to the food crisis emerged the new Agriculture-First strategy; heavy industry was now last in the official list of economic priorities.[62] Increased agricultural investment was not, it became clear, merely an emergency measure but the foundation of a long-range program. Nineteen-sixty-two marked the beginning of what one writer has called "China's Green Revolution."[63] Ten high-yield regions were selected to receive the benefits of the new agricultural investments. Heavy application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, improved seed varieties, mechanized irrigation and more extensive multiple cropping combined to create an impressive rise in output. At the same time, there was considerable progress in research on mechanization; and in the mid-1960s, factories began to turn out a wide variety of new machines adapted to the technical requirements of Chinese agriculture.

The principle of detente with the peasants was firmly established; at the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, the revisions in the Commune system were reaffirmed. Some, including Deng, wanted to go farther; they argued for legitimizing the household contracts or even (if Red Guard reports are to be believed) legally restoring private land ownership.[64] However, Mao succeeded in blocking this move. In industry, there was a new emphasis on profit quotas rather than sheer volume of physical output. The nationwide speed-ups were not revived; "socialist emulation" became purely ritualized. (Which is not to say, of course, that there were never attempts to speed-up workers in a particular factory or that working conditions were ideal; poor safety conditions have often been observed by foreign tourists.[65]) Late in 1963, the reorganization of industry into "socialist trusts" was begun on a trial basis in several branches of production.[66] Each trust was to encompass all of the nationalized enterprises in a particular branch; the directors would be granted a wide margin of freedom from Party and State control, and investment decisions were to be based on the profit principle. As part of the industrial reorganization, plants which operated at a loss were shut down, and thousands of superfluous workers were sent down to the countryside.

Although there was a general improvement of living conditions under the new policies, there were still many groups with specific grievances.[67] Much of the potential dissent was directly linked to the economic slowdown of the early 1960s. Graduating students, for example, discovered that there were not enough jobs; many could look forward only to years of unemployment or, worse, being sent down to the villages. Workers in modern industry were in a relatively privileged and secure position, but a large segment of the urban labor force—the sub-proletariat of temporary and contract workers—were not so fortunate.[68] Hired at the lowest wages for the hardest and most dangerous jobs, with none of the fringe benefits granted to permanent workers, housed in wretched conditions, they had ample reason to resent the architects of the new economic policy. By the mid-1960s, according to one estimate, the sub-proletariat made up about 30 to 40 percent of the nonagricultural workforce.[69]

Potential sources of opposition to the dominant "rightist" faction also existed within the bureaucracy itself. New job opportunities were not opening up as rapidly as in the first plan period, and with the top positions monopolized by the

older generation of civil war veterans, prospects for advancement seemed dim for ambitious young apparatchiks. In addition, the new emphasis on technical expertise rather than loyalty to the Party line threatened the careers of those who were unable to adapt to the new demands. Tensions within the apparatus and discontent among the urban population provided opportunities, which Mao was soon to take advantage of, for political agitation.

After a brief semi-retirement from the political scene, Mao returned to center stage at the Tenth Plenum. He called for a "Socialist Education Campaign" in the countryside, designed to strengthen the collective elements of the rural economy and take back some of the concessions made to the peasants during the crisis years.[70] The 1957 campaign of the same name had prepared the way for an increase of the level of collectivization; that Mao intended a repeat performance seems likely. The peasants were encouraged to "Learn from Dazhai," a model production brigade which reportedly raised output tremendously through strenuous efforts, a high rate of investment, and voluntary austerity. One pro-Maoist author who visited Dazhai and interviewed its leader, Chen Yongguei, notes—in all innocence—that the neighboring villages "distrusted Ch'en and his tendency to deliver the maximum amount of grain to the state."[71] That is: Chen and his brigade were agricultural rate-busters. The Daqing oilfields provided a similar model for industrial workers. The "Daqing spirit" has been summed up in the "ten no's," which include "fearing neither hardship nor death" and "paying no heed to whether working conditions are good or bad, whether working hours are long or short, whether pay and position are high or low."[72] Mao also called for a revival of the program of rural industrialization.[73] Where all of this was heading is clear enough—back to the GLF.

In these initiatives, Mao received the full support of Defense Minister Lin Biao.[74] It was the People's Liberation Army [PLA], not the Party, which first distributed the famous Little Red Book of Mao quotes, and it was the Army which sponsored Jiang Qing's socialist-realist refashioning of Chinese opera. The entire population was adjured to "Learn from the PLA" and from model soldiers like Lei Feng, whose only desire was to be a "rust-proof screw" in the revolutionary machinery. In the factories and villages, the People's Militia—which fell under the PLA's chain of command—played a major role in the "Socialist Education Campaign." By contrast, the Party claimed to be carrying out Mao's directives, but in fact consistently undermined them. For example, "socialist education" was used as a pretext for purging basic-level cadres who had supported Mao's line; among those who came under fire was Dazhai's Chen Yongguei, who was saved only by Mao's intervention.[75] Mao became impatient with the Party's obstructions and concluded that he could no longer win over his Politburo colleagues to his point of view; he would have to purge them. In the past, Mao had demonstrated his ability to manipulate conflicts within the bureaucracy and had even attempted to use the masses against the apparatus. In the coming Cultural Revolution, he would try to do the same but on a far larger scale, since he had to overcome much greater resistance from the Party this time.

In 1966 Mao, with a strong assist from Lin's Army, launched a "revolution" against the bureaucratic apparatus of which he was the nominal leader: the Chinese Communist Party. Mao's battle plan, which seems to have been partly worked out in advance and partly improvised, was based on students' and workers' discontents and cadres' frustrated career ambitions. Mao's attack on his "revisionist" Party opponents provided the younger bureaucrats, and those who had been pushed aside during the course of the "rightist" trend, with an opportunity to better their positions, as well as an ideological rationale for doing so. Student and worker unrest was the weapon which these Maoist cadres were to use against the "capitalist-roaders." For the most part, the PLA was to be held in reserve, though it played some role in assisting the student Red Guard groups and probably had a hand in the Maoist seizure of power in Beijing.[76]

It would be out of place here to trace out all of the twists and turns of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

[GPCR], but one point does need to be made.[77] Many have seen Mao's appeal to the masses to "bombard the (Party) headquarters" as an indication that his goal was "strengthening the position of the people vis-a-vis the powerful Party and government structures." A brief look at the role of workers in the GPCR in Shanghai, where the Maoist faction accomplished its most successful "power seizure," will put this interpretation to the test.[79] All attempts by the Shanghai Maoists to topple the municipal Party Committee by mobilizing local students (reinforced by Maoist students from Beijing) were easily stalemated, as the Party proved equally adept at organizing student and worker support. It was only when the Maoists urged the sub-proletariat to revolt—Jiang Qing denounced contract labor as "capitalist" and promised to abolish it—that the Party's power crumbled and the "Gang of Four" stepped into the ensuing power vacuum. Once in charge, however, the Maoists retracted all of their promises to the underprivileged workers: their organizations were branded "counterrevolutionary" and broken up by the police. Although most of the city's workers refused to obey the Maoists back-to-work order, their strikes were gradually broken by soldiers, students and Maoist workers. A show of force by the local PLA garrison—its commander declared that it would "ruthlessly suppress" all opposition to the new administration, and troops were paraded through the streets to back up the threat—may have contributed to the success of the Maoists' strikebreaking. It could hardly be clearer that the masses played a limited role in Mao's scheme. Although they made the "revolution," the workers and students were to have no part in defining its goals.

Throughout most of the country, the Maoist plan did not work as well as in Shanghai. Maoist and anti-Maoist mass organizations fought it out in the streets, and China was soon, as Mao himself said, on the brink of civil war. In the end the Army had to be called in to restore order—and this restoration of law and order ultimately required mass arrests and sometimes public executions of "anarchists" and "Guomindang agents"—that is, Red Guards who continued to resist the new authorities.[80]

After the Cultural Revolution

Since the Army, led by a loyal Maoist, was in control, it might have seemed at first glance that conditions were ideal for a revival of the GLF development strategy. But the Army itself was ridden with factional intrigues; Lin did not even have a firm grip on his central military machine, and the sympathies of the regional commanders lay with the old guard. Half of the provinces, at most, were in the hands of reliable allies of Mao

and Lin. Mao's "revolution" had been far from a total success.

Nonetheless, the Mao/Lin faction did try to revive the Leap Forward in 1969-71.[81] Lin Biao raised the banner of a new "Flying Leap" inscribed with old Maoist slogans, such as "More, better, faster, cheaper." The GLF's "Everyone a Soldier" motto was echoed by Lin's demand that "700 million people, 700 million soldiers...become a single military camp." The most consistent Maoist advances were made in the fields of education and culture, the strongholds of the "Gang of Four." In industry, material incentives came under attack, and there were sporadic efforts to launch a new speed-up drive. However, these policies were not applied with the same vigor as in the GLF and did not spread beyond the regions where the Mao/Lin group held power. The same might be said of agricultural policy; all of the elements of the Leap-Forward strategy reappeared, but only in limited geographical areas. Labor batalions were again set to work on irrigation projects, and locally financed rural industries flourished once more. Private plots, rural markets, and private handicrafts were threatened. There were renewed efforts to transfer decision-making power up to the brigade level. After the excellent spring 1970 harvest, State grain procurements were increased. Where these policies were applied, they soon met with the same results as in the GLF and the mini-Leap; for example, peasants responded to the higher procurements by slacking off during the harvesting.

These attempts to return to policies which had repeatedly proven dangerous no doubt solidified Party resistance to Mao and his chosen successor; by September 1971 Lin had permanently vanished from the scene, and along with him went Chen Boda, Mao's chief theoretician and (some say) ghost-writer. Several conflicting stories were issued by the authorities; the final version was that Lin had died in a plane crash while fleeing to the Soviet Union after a failed coup d'etat. Whatever the truth about the Lin Biao affair—whether he actually did clash with Mao (perhaps over foreign policy, as Lin is known to have opposed detente with the US) or whether Mao simply went along with a purge which he was powerless to prevent[82]Lin's fall was in any case a fatal blow to Mao's hopes of resurrecting his neo-Stalinist development strategy. It deprived Mao of his main source of military support and marked the beginning of the decline of the Maoist faction that culminated in the arrest of Mao's last handful of loyalists after his death.

From 1973 to 1976 Mao's personal entourage, the "Gang of Four," launched a series of increasingly desperate attacks on the "revisionist" old guard, which was steadily regaining the ground it had lost in the GPCR.[83] Most of the purged "capitalist-roaders" were rehabilitated, despite the Maoists' opposition. The "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius," "Study the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," "Criticize *Water Margin*," and "Criticize Deng Xiaoping and Beat Back the Right Deviationist Wind" campaigns were all episodes in the Maoists' futile struggle to mobilize the masses for a new Cultural-Revolutionary assault on the Party "rightists." The issue at stake in this ongoing political contest was the fate of Mao's social and economic program.

That the Maoists' goal in industry remained the same as in the GLF can be readily seen from the wall posters put up by Maoist cadres and workers during the 1974 "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" campaign; the main themes of the posters were raising output and restricting consumption. Factory leaders were criticized for a variety of errors—being "generous in giving out overtime payments"; organizing festivities and handing out small gifts to celebrate the overfulfillment of the yearly plan, which "can only weaken morality and undermine fighting spirit"; failing to go to the grassroots and "mobilize the masses' immense socialist enthusiasm"; and surrendering to workers' demands that they be allowed to go home after meeting their daily quota. The positive models held up for workers and managers included a shock brigade of auto-repair workers who worked more than ten hours a day without lunch breaks, accomplishing a month's work in five days; the managers of a coal mine who organized the older workers to criticize their younger colleagues, who had "complained of hardship, feared hard work, and could not meet good labor discipline," with the result that the younger workers were transformed into a "shock force in production"; and a labor hero who induced his fellow workers to do "two years' work in one" and was rewarded with a promotion.[84] In agriculture, as well, the "Gang of Four" (or Five, counting Mao) harked back to the GLF; thus, during the 1975 "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" campaign, private plots were again seized and rural markets abolished in a few provinces.[85]

The final act in the drama, played out in the two years after Mao's death, pitted Deng's "rightist" old guard against a moderate Maoist group, led by Hua Guofeng and consisting of bureaucrats who had advanced during the GPCR but were not identified with the more extreme form of Maoism represented by the "Gang." The details of this stage of the struggle will be examined in the next issue of this magazine; for the moment, it will suffice to note that the battle has ended in total victory for Deng. The last vestiges of Maoism are being eradicated, and the Bukharinist program has been implemented even more thoroughly than during the early 1960s. Political conflict will undoubtedly continue in China, especially if the new right turn leads into another blind alley; but, it does not seem likely that the Maoist/Stalinist development strategy will ever be revived again. I hope the reader will agree that this fact is no occasion for regret.

Bill Russell

Pinyin	*Wade-Giles*
Beijing	Peking
Chen Yongguei	Ch'en Yung-kuei
Chen Yun	Ch'en Yun
Daqing	Tach'ing
Dazhai	Tachai
Deng Xiaoping	Teng Hsiao-p'ing
Guomindang	Kuomintang
Hua Guofeng	Hua Kuo-feng
Jiang Qing	Chiang Ch'ing
Lin Biao	Lin Piao
Mao Zedong	Mao Tse-tung
Peng Dehuai	P'eng Te'huai

Notes

1. Among these works are: Maria Macciocchi, *Daily Life in Revolutionary China* (NY: Monthly Review, 1972); Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *China: Inside the People's Republic* (NY: Bantam, 1972); and K.S. Karol, *The Second Chinese Revolution* (NY: Hill and Wang, 1975). Karol's book is more than recycled propaganda, but not up to the standard of his book on Cuba.

2. See, for example, Charles Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Forward," *Monthly Review* 30, no. 3 (July/August 1978) and the series of replies in *Monthly Review* 31, no. 1 (May 1979).

3. For example, see Jean Chesneaux, *China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976* (NY: Pantheon Books, 1979).

4. A concise summary of the Soviet First Five-Year Plan can be found in Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (NY: Penguin Pelican, 1975), chaps. 7 and 8; on the collectivization campaign, see Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

5. Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 313. This book, compiled from secret archives captured during the second world war, gives a vivid picture of the impact of Stalinism on the Russian populace.

6. The very word "collectivization" is, of course, an ideological mystification in the state-capitalist context, since the leaders of the collective farms receive their orders from the Party/State bureaucracy, not from their fellow collective farmers.

7. On Bukharin's economic ideas, see Nove, *op. cit.*, chap. 5; Lewin, *op. cit.*, chap. 12, sec. 3; and Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (NY: Random House, Vintage, 1974), chap. 6.

8. The situation in the USSR after Stalin's death is described in Wolfgang Leonard, *The Kremlin since Stalin* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975 reprint of 1962 ed.), chap. 3; on Eastern Europe, see Chris Harman, *Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London: Pluto Press, 1974), chap. 3 and *passim*.

9. See K.C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies," in *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences*, ed. Donald W. Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967).

10. A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-55* (NY: Praeger, 1964), pp. 244-45.

11. *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (henceforth *SCMP*), no. 893 supplement and no. 1024. Further examples will be cited in a book I am writing on the Chinese proletariat under Mao. See also Ygael Gluckstein, *Mao's China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), chaps. 11-15, for more information on labor conditions during the Chinese First FYP.

12. *SCMP*, no. 631.

13. Gluckstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-18.

14. This editorial is translated in *SCMP*, no. 986; the announcement of the author's purge is in *SCMP*, no. 1849.

15. This account of the early collectivization attempts is drawn from: Barnett, *op. cit.*, chaps. 13 and 18; Thomas Bernstein, "Keeping the Revolution Going: Problems of Village Leadership after Land Reform," in *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, ed. John W. Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); and Kenneth Walker, "Collectivization in Retrospect: The Socialist High Tide of Autumn 1955-Spring 1956," *China Quarterly*, no. 26. The statistics are from Yeh, "Agricultural Policies and Performance," in *China: A Handbook*, ed. Yuan-li Wu (NY: Praeger, 1973).

16. On the urban problems, see Chesneaux, *op. cit.*, p. 66; and Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China* (NY: Free Press, 1977), pp. 135-36. Peasant resistance is mentioned in Walker, *OP. CIT.*

17. The reasons for the differences are examined in Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilization in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivization Campaigns of 1929-30 and 1956-57: A Comparison," *China Quarterly*, no. 31.

18. On the grain crisis, see Bernstein, "Cadre and Peasant Behav-

ior under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation: The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955," in *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969).

19. Parris Chang, *Power and Policy in China* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), p. 9.

20. Benedict Stavis, *The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 51.

21. Anthony Tang, "Policy and Performance in Agriculture," in *Economic Trends in Communist China*, ed. Alexander Eckstein *et al.* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968), p. 467. The dependence of China's industrial growth rates on agricultural output is demonstrated in Tang's essay.

23. Yeh, "Industrialization Strategies," p. 343, table 2.

23. Christopher Howe and Kenneth Walker, "The Economist," in *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History*, ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 184-85.

24. Ezra Vogel, *Canton under Communism* (NY: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 140-41, 159-60; and Merton Fletcher, *Workers and Commissars*, Program in East Asian Studies, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Bellingham, Wash.: Western Washington State College, 1974), p. 39.

25. Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, 2d ed. (NY: Grove Press, 1968), p. 444.

26. Stuart Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (NY: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 92 and 231.

27. Benjamin Schwartz, "China's Developmental Experience, 1949-72," in *China's Development Experience*, ed. Michel Oksenberg (NY: Praeger, 1973), p. 22.

28. Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (NY: International Publishers, 1966), p. 468.

29. Martin Nicolaus, *Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR* (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1975), p. 33.

30. For example, Richard Levy, "New Light on Mao: His Views on the Soviet Union's Political Economy," *China Quarterly*, no. 61.

31. Mao Tse-tung, *Critique of Soviet Economics* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 119.

32. Howe and Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

33. On the policy in practice in the early to mid-1960s, see Stavis, *op. cit.*, chaps. 8 and 9. Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 55-56, suggests that the issues between the two factions were already being debated at least as early as 1957.

34. The Maoist strategy is described in Chang, *op. cit.*, chap. 1; and Stavis, *op. cit.*, chaps. 5-7.

35. The general argument is made in Jack Gray, "The Two Roads," in *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, ed. Stuart Schram (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). On the economic rationale of Mao's educational reforms, see also Joel Glassman, "Educational Reform and Manpower Policy in China, 1955-58," *Modern China* 3, no. 3 (July 1977).

36. Supervision of the masses is explicitly mentioned as a reason for the system of cadre labor in the official press; see R.J. Birrell, "The Centralized Control of the Communes in the Post-'Great Leap' Period," in Barnett, *Chinese Communist Politics*, pp. 435-36.

37. Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

38. That China's economic "liberation" of women has been a function of economic needs is demonstrated in Batya Weinbaum, "Women in Transition to Socialism: Perspectives on the Chinese Case," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 8, no. 1.

39. On the mini-Leap and its vicissitudes, see Chang, *op. cit.*, chap. 1; Roderick McFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1974), vol. 1, chaps. 1-7; Walker, "Organization of Agricultural Production," in Eckstein *et al.*, *Economic Trends*; and Vogel, *op. cit.*, chaps. 4 and 5.

40. In particular, Gray, *op. cit.*; see also his "The Economics of Maoism," in *China after the Cultural Revolution*, ed. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (NY: Vintage, 1970). Others who have drawn the same conclusion include Schram, McFarquhar, and Meisner.

41. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 September 1978.

42. Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

43. Cited in Rene Goldman, "The Rectification Campaign at Peking University, May-June 1957," in *China under Mao: Politics Takes Command*, ed. McFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 263-64.

44. McFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (NY: Praeger, 1960), pp. 242-47.

45. McFarquhar, *Origins*, chap. 18.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-33.

47. Gray, "Two Roads," p. 133.

48. Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

49. Walker, "Organization," pp. 434-40; Vogel, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-5, 220; and McFarquhar, *Origins*, p. 313.

50. Charles Hoffman, *The Chinese Worker* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 145-50.

51. Vogel, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-9.

52. *SCMP*, nos. 1675 and 1680; see also P. Brune, "La Chine a l'heure de la perfection totalitaire," *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, no. 29, pp. 61-62.

53. Stephen Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution* (NY: Pantheon, 1977), p. 82. Andors, a former editor of the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, is the most sophisticated and scholarly proponent of the Maoist theory of participatory management.

54. The following account of the GLF is based on: Chang, *op. cit.*, chaps. 3-5; Vogel, *op. cit.*, chap. 6; the introduction to *Communist China 1955-59: Policy Documents with Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962); Kang Chao, "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China," *Asian Survey*, May 1964. On the People's Communes, see Gluckstein, "The Chinese People's Communes," *International Socialism*, Spring 1960; and G.F. Hudson *et al.*, *The Chinese Communes* (London: Soviet Survey, 1960).

55. For an eyewitness account of the factory trials, see Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China* (NY: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 97-99. The trade-union purge is described in Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

56. *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines*, no. 136.

57. Statistics are taken from Gluckstein, "Communes"; and Choh-ming Li, "Economic Development," in *Origins*, ed. McFarquhar.

58. *Communist China 1955-59*, p. 501.

59. See Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations,'" in *Origins*, ed. McFarquhar, pp. 64-66.

60. *Ibid.*

61. Franz Shurmann, "China's 'New Economic Policy'—Transition or Beginning?" in *Origins*, ed. McFarquhar.

62. It still, however, received the lion's share of investment!

63. Stavis, *op. cit.*, chap. 8.

64. Byung-joon Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 77.

65. See, for example, Barry Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China* (NY: Random House, 1969), p. 379; Charlotte Salisbury, *China Diary* (NY: Walker, 1963), pp. 83-84; Warren Phillips and Robert Keatley, *China: Behind the Mask* (Princeton, NJ: Dow Jones, 1973), p. 99; and Julia Kristeva, *About Chinese Women* (NY: Urizen, 1977), pp. 160-61. Conditions in factories not open to foreign inspection are no doubt worse.

66. Ahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-44.

67. Andrew Walder, *Chang Chun-ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, no. 32 (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1978), chap. 6.

68. David and Nancy Milton, *The Wind Will Not Subside* (NY: Pantheon, 1976), p. 188; and Hector Mandares *et al.*, eds. *Revolution culturelle dans la Chine populaire* (Paris: Editions 10/18, 1974), pp. 159-162.

69. Christopher Howe, "Labour Organization and Incentives in Industry, before and after the Cultural Revolution," in *Authority*, ed. Schram, p. 135.

70. On the rural "Socialist Education Campaign," see Richard Baum, *Prelude to Revolution* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1975).

71. Karol, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

72. *The National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Industry: Selected Documents* (Peking, 1977), pp. 7-8.

73. Stavis, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-227.

74. Ahn, *op. cit.*, chap. 6; Vogel, *op. cit.*, chap. 7; and Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in*

74. Ahn, *op. cit.*, chap. 6; Vogel, *op. cit.*, chap. 7; and Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 547 and 575.

75. For Chen's tribulations, see Karol, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69. "Socialist education" was also turned against Maoist factory cadres: see Neale Hunter, *Shanghai Journal* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 38-39.

76. Jurgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), p. 10.

77. As good as any of the available histories of the GPCR is Jean Esmein, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (NY: Doubleday, Anchor, 1973). For a student participant's viewpoint, see Gordon Bennet and Ronald Montaperto, *Red Guard* (NY: Doubleday, Anchor, 1971). Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) is also quite good.

78. Ray Wylie, "Revolution within a Revolution?" in *China after the Cultural Revolution*, ed. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 79.

79. Walder, *op. cit.*, provides an excellent summary of the literature of the GPCR in Shanghai and has a good bibliography. One essential work on the topic is Hunter, *op. cit.*, an eyewitness account; the reliability of this book has been conclusively established; it has been attacked by William Hinton.

80. See Domes, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

81. Various aspects of the "Flying Leap" are discussed in Domes, *op. cit.*, chaps. 4 and 7; Stavis, *op. cit.*, chap. 9 and epilogue.

82. The latter position is argued convincingly in Domes, *op. cit.*, chap. 8; see also Jaap van Ginneken, *The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao* (NY: Avon, 1977).

83. This period will be examined in further detail in a later issue of *Root & Branch*.

84. *Summary of World Broadcast: Far East*, nos. 4506, 4508, 4530, 4545, and 4591.

85. See van Ginneken, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-7; see also Text 21 in *And Mao Makes Five*, ed. Raymond Lotta (Chicago: Banner, 1978).

THEORY AND PRACTICE
An Introduction to Marxian Theory

> Thus we do not confront the world dogmatically with a new principle, proclaiming: Here is the truth, kneel before it! We develop for the world new principles out of the principles of the world. We do not say to the world: Give up your struggles, they are stupid stuff, we will provide you with the true watchword of the struggle. We merely demonstrate to the world why it really struggles, and consciousness is something that it *must* adopt, even if it does not want to do so. —Karl Marx, 1843.[1]

In his critique of the leftwing philosophies attacked as the "German Ideology," Karl Marx contrasted communist literature that can be thought of "merely as a set of theoretical writings" with that which is "the product of a real movement." In his polemic against the so-called True Socialists, he pointed out that theory, as an activity of particular people carried out in particular social contexts, does not develop by a process of "pure thought" but springs "from the practical needs, the whole conditions of life of a particular class in particular countries."[2] In his own theoretical work his aim was to serve what he considered the practical needs of the working class in its struggle against capitalism throughout the world. This for Marx did not mean an abandonment of claims to objectivity or scientific truth, but the opposite. Those who wish to control their social (as their natural) conditions of life need to understand the situations in which they find themselves and the possible choices of action within these situations. Such a view meant that, on the other hand, Marx's opposition to utopian thought did not imply submission to a pre-determined historical process. By "scientific socialism," as Marx put it in reply to criticism by Bakunin, he meant—in contrast with "utopian socialism which seeks to foist new fantasies upon the people"—"the comprehension of the social movement created by the people themselves."[3] The historical process Marx was interested in would consist precisely in people's attempts to change the society in which they find themselves. Theoretical work, in leading to a better understanding of society and so of the tasks involved in changing it, should serve as an element of these attempts.

Marx states in *The German Ideology*:

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life.
>
> The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these. . . .Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.[4]

Once consciousness is construed as the organization of human activity, then revolutionary consciousness, like its opposite, can be understood as the systems and quasi-systems of conceptions, feelings, etc. by means of which people organize their revolutionary (or non-revolutionary) behavior. All action involves theory, or at least some degree of coherent thinking. Like everyone, revolutionaries think about what they are doing: the theoreticians among them are those who try to systematize and explore and understand the human interactions that constitute the social status quo and the movement against it.

Although this understanding of the role of thought in revolutionary activity runs throughout Marx's development as a thinker, only in the course of real political experiences (and reflection thereon) did its implications emerge. A major turning-point seems to have been the revolutionary period of 1848-49 on the Continent, which saw Marx return from exile to edit a left democratic newspaper in Cologne. As Friedrich Engels, at that time already Marx's closest friend and political companion, explained in the introduction he wrote for a collection of Marx's articles from that period,

> When the February Revolution broke out [in France in 1848], we all of us, as far as our conceptions of the conditions and the course of revolutionary movements were concerned, were under the spell of previous historical experience.

in particular that of the French Revolution of 1789. What all revolutions up to then (the bourgeois revolutions) had in common

> was that they were minority revolutions. Even where the majority took part, it did so—whether wittingly or not, only in the service of a minority; but because of this, or simply because of the passive, unresisting attitude of the majority, this minority acquired the appearance of being the representative of the whole people.

It seemed as though the proletarian revolution would have the same form. In this case, however, the minority leading the revolution would for the first time be actually acting in the interest of the majority. The minority was needed for this leadership role, it seemed at the time, because "the proletarian masses themselves, even in Paris, were still absolutely in the dark as to the path to be taken. And yet the movement was there, instinctive, spontaneous, irrepressible." It needed for success only guidance from the vanguard, those who, combining in themselves understanding of history, economics, and a philosophical comprehension of the tasks of humanity, would be able to adminster the creation of the new social world.[5]

The parallel with the position of the Marxists in the Russian Revolution of 1918 is worth noting. We find Engels in 1853 guessing that on the next outbreak of revolution "our Party will one fine morning be forced to assume power" to carry out the bourgeois revolution. Then, "driven by the proletarian populace, bound by our own printed declarations . . . we shall be constained to undertake communist experiments . . . the untimeliness of which we know better than anyone else. In doing so we lose our heads—only physically speaking, let us hope." The similarity between the "backward country like Germany" at this time, "which possesses an advanced party and is involved in an advanced revolution with an advanced country like France" and the situation of Russia in relation to the German revolution following the first world war, explains the eerie character of Engels' ideas as prophetic of the Bolshevik seizure of power.[6] In the event, however, Lenin and Trotsky took care to save their heads, physically speaking, even at the expense of those of the more revolutionary workers.

As Engels noted, history proved this vision of minority-directed revolution, classically associated with the name of Blanqui, wrong. In fact, despite alliances with Blanquist groups during 1848-50, Marx (and Engels) already by this time seem to have rejected this vanguardist model of revolution. They argued for open democracy, instead of conspiratorial secrecy and hierarchy, within the communist organizations they worked with; for democracy structured by mass meetings and recallability of delegates, as the basis for "proletarian dictatorship"; and, above all, for the conception that communism could not be imposed by the will of political thinkers and activists but could only be created by a vast mass movement in response to actual social conditions.[7]

A communist movement, in Marx's opinion, could only



Das Kapital.

Kritik der politischen Oekonomie.

Von

Karl Marx.

Erster Band.

Hamburg

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1867.

Title-page of the first volume of *Capital*

arise as the development of the capitalist system transformed the majority of the population into wage-workers. In 1848-50, Marx and his friends believed that this development was proceeding quite rapidly, but in reality Europe was far from ripe for communism. Capitalism was only getting started in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the series of economic and social crises that followed that of 1847 were milestones on a road of continued and rapid economic growth. It was this development, wrote Engels in the text quoted above, which "for the first time produced clarity in the class relationships" by creating a real capitalist and a real proletarian class. The process of economic growth which pushed these classes "into the foreground of capitalist development" was also a process of struggle between them. By making it possible for masses of workers to understand their common interest and common antagonism to their employers, this process clarified the conditions of socialist revolution.

In fact Engels proved optimistic; the growth of Social Democracy did not represent the clarification of the nature of the class struggle that he thought it did in its first decades. The events of 1848 and the subsequent development of capitalism and of the socialist movement had, however, a definite effect on Marx's thought. In the first place, it turned Marx's attention to economic crisis as a key to the existence and meaning of the socialist movement. His renewed study of economics in the 1850s reflected his conviction that socialist revolution would have to come out of a response to social conditions on the part of the workers. Hence Marx dedicated his life's work to showing how capitalism, in its very process of growth and development, simultaneously creates the form and the content of its overthrow.

Marx's position was, generally, that the social interdependency, brought about by industrial capitalism, both within and between workplaces of different types would provide a basis both for revolutionary action against the old, and for the creation of a new, society. The transformation of peasant agriculture into large-scale farming by wage-labor for the market and the development of mass-production industry have bound the producers economically—and so socially—to each other. As each individual's productive labor requires coordination with his colleagues', so the individual's consumption depends upon the productive work of countless others. This characteristic of the current system explains the ideal formulated by its socialist opponents of a "collective commonwealth of labor," in which the producers themselves (and not a distinct class of owners or managers) would jointly control their labor and its products.

The nature of the goal dictates the form which revolutionary organizations must have. Ultimately, the "revolutionary organization" will have to be the working class as a whole: thus, Marx spoke of particular organizations as episodes "in the history of the party which everywhere grows up naturally



and spontaneously from the soil of modern society."[8] He thought it essential, therefore, that the working class movement avoid the characteristics of the leftwing *sect*. The sect, as Marx put it in a letter, "sees the justification for its existence and its point of honor not in what it has in *common* with the class movement but in the *particular shibboleth* which *distinguishes* it from the movement." The attitude of the sectarian theoretician and leader—exemplified for Marx by Proudhon, Bakunin, and Lasalle—is (as he wrote of the latter) that "instead of looking among the genuine elements of the class movement for the real basis of his agitation, he wanted to prescribe the course to be followed by this movement according to a certain doctrinaire recipe." This is not to say that sects cannot have useful insights to offer the movement. Marx, for instance, honored Fourier, in contradistinction to the Fourierists; for the former wrote in a period in which "doctrinaire" propaganda could not interfere with the growth of the (barely existing) movement. To the extent that a real workers' movement comes into existence, the little parties and groups should "merge in the class movement and make an end of all sectarianism."[9]

Thus the *General Rules* which Marx drew up in 1864 for the International Working Men's Association, began with Flora Tristan's dictum, "That the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working class themselves." The International was intended to be the opposite of a sect, in both theory and practice. It proclaimed as its business, in Marx's words, "to combine and generalize the spontaneous movements of the working classes, but not to dictate or impose any doctrinaire system whatever."[10] And, regarding organization, Marx argued against centralism, on the grounds that a centralist structure, though appropriate to sectarian movements, "goes against the nature of trade unions," struggle organizations of workers. Typical of his attitude is his remark in a letter of 1868 that especially in Germany, "where the worker's life is regulated from childhood on by bureaucracy and he himself believes in the authoritarian bodies appointed over him, he must be taught above all else to walk by himself."[11] In the same spirit, Marx refused the presidency of the International in 1866, and soon afterwards convinced its General Council to replace the post with that of a chairman to be elected at every weekly meeting.

This attitude was reflected in Marx's conception of the tasks of intellectuals in the movement. He put his writing skills at the service of the International, in preparing statements of position, official communications, and so forth. In addition, we should note the project of an "*Enquete Ouvriere*," a questionnaire which Marx published in the Parisian *Revue Socialiste* in 1880, and had reprinted and distributed to workers' groups, socialist and democratic circles, "and to anyone else who asked for it" in France. The text has the form of 101 questions, about working conditions, wages, hours, effects of the trade cycle, and also about workers' defense organizations, strikes and other forms of struggle, and their results. Though this might be described as the first sociological survey, its preface urges workers to reply, not to meet the data needs of sociologists or economists, but because only workers can describe "with full knowledge the evils which they endure" just as "they, and not any providential saviors, can energetically administer the remedies for the social ills from which they suffer." Strategy and tactics, to use the terms of more recent leftwing theory, can only be created by workers who know their concrete conditions, not by "leaders." Intellectuals can, however, play an important role in the collection and transmission of information; thus, the results of the *Enquete* were to be analyzed in a series of articles for the *Revue*, and, eventually, a book.[12]

The main task that Marx took on as a revolutionary intellectual, however, as the task of theory: the elaboration of a set of concepts, at a fairly abstract level, that would permit a better comprehension of the struggle between labor and capital. He prefaced the French serial edition of the first volume of *Capital* with an expression of pleasure, because "in this form the book will be more accessible to the working class—a consideration which to me outweighs everything else."[13] The function of theory was to help the movement as a whole clarify its problems and possibilities; it did not, in Marx's view, place the theorist in a dominating (or "hegemonic," as the currently fashionable euphemism has it) position vis-a-vis the movement, but was rather what he had to contribute to a collective effort.

In the light of the career of official Marxism since Marx's time, his criticism of Feuerbach's recasting of eighteenth century materialism has a prophetic cast:

> The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. This doctrine has therefore to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.[14]

—Or, we may add, superior to the class it claims it represents, just as the *philosophes* claimed to represent the interests of society or of humanity as a whole. And in fact, as the "unity of theory and practice," in the form of "scientific socialism," became a basic element of orthodoxy in those organizations and currents of thought which presented themselves as Marxist, it took on just this doctrinal flavor.

The relationship of revolutionary theory to political practice acquired the practical form of the relationship of theorists (mostly middle-class intellectuals) within political organizations to the masses of workers they supposedly represented and gave direction to. For instance, by maintaining that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement," Lenin in 1902 meant that "socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something that arose within it spontaneously." He quoted Kautsky, the high priest of Social Democratic orthodoxy:

> Of course, socialism, as a doctrine, has its roots in modern economic relationships just as the class struggle of the proletariat has and, like the latter, emerges from the struggle against the capitalist-created poverty and misery of the masses. But socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other. . . .Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. . . .The vehicle of science is not the proletariat but the *bourgeois intelligentsia*. . .the task of Social-Democracy is to imbue the proletariat with the consciousness of its position and the consciousness of its task.

Thus, as Lenin continued in his own words, "since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the *only* choice is either bourgeois or socialist ideology"—in either case supplied by the intellectuals.[15]

This position reflected (and was to justify) the actual division of labor within the Marxist movements, which, like the division in society as a whole, lay between professional leaders, or decision-makers, and the masses, who were to be provided by the former with outlook, strategy, and tactics. Aside from its outward implausibility as a theory of consciousness and of how it changes, that this position represented only an ideological expression of the interests of the professional revolutionaries as a social group was amply shown by events around the time of the first world war. In Western Europe, Marxist theory, "orthodox" as well as "revisionist," turned out to be compatible with an organizational practice that was not only less revolutionary than, but actively reactionary in comparison with, the response of large numbers of workers to the new crisis conditions. In Germany and Russia (as elsewhere) Marxist organizations responded to the revolutionary upheavals that followed the war either (in the West) as saviors of capitalism or (in Russia) as the creators of a new state power suppresaing the attempts of workers to gain direct power over production. Social Democracy, in its reformist and in its revolutionary (Bolshevik) forms alike, showed its relation to the needs of particular classes in particular countries: the rationalization, especially through state action, of capitalism in the West; and the creation of a new class society to carry out the process of industrialization forbidden the bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped East.

In contrast to the dominant interpretation of the "unity of theory and practice" as the control of the workers' movement by the Party and of socialist society by the party-state, around the turn of the century Rosa Luxemburg revived Marx's conception by expressing the idea that a truly socialist movement must be "the first in the history of class societies which reckons, in all its phases and throughout its entire course, on the organization and the direct, independent action of the masses." As she saw it, "social democratic activity . . . arises historically out of the elementary class struggle," and becomes "aware of its objectives in the course of the struggle itself." In her opinion the activity of the self-proclaimed carrier of revolutionary theory, the bourgeois intelligentsia, constituted a subsidiary and politically less dependable element of the revolutionary process. It posed the threat, as she saw long before the Bolshevik *coup d'etat*, of dictatorship over the proletariat, in the left organizations and the future society alike. Against Kautsky and Lenin, she proclaimed that

> The working class demands the right to make its own mistakes and learn in the dialectic of history.
>
> Let us speak plainly. Historically, the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee.[14]

This position too reflected the experience and needs of a particular segment of society at a particular time—not only ultraleft theoreticians but also the working-class militants with whom they associated in their organizational activity. By Rosa Luxemburg's time there was considerable evidence both of the negative effects on workers' radicalism of trade-union and parliamentary politics and of workers' ability to organize their own radical activity in the absence of, and indeed in the face of, official left organizational efforts. The truth of Luxemburg's perceptions was shown decisively, on the one hand, by the class-collaborationist policy of the Second International in Western Europe in 1914, and by the development of the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia; and, on the other, by the spontaneously organized revolutions in Germany and Russia, as well as similar, though less spectacular, occurrences throughout the West. Moreover, while Rosa Luxemburg still believed in the necessity of a party organization as the basis for revolution, the actual events showed the greater importance of new forms of organization arising from the social relationships in which workers' lives were structured. In the factory committees, in soviets, and in workers', soldiers', and peasants' councils, Marx's concept of the development of the new society in the womb of the old took on a concrete meaning. This historical experience therefore involved also a justification of Marx's attitude towards the relation of "consciousness," theoretical and tactical, to the real activity of social groups.

These events provoked a rebirth of revolutionary analysis, as militants involved in, or affected by, the post-World War I struggles attempted to understand the failure of the Second International, the counter-revolutionary character of the Third (and its Trotskyist caricature), and the potentiality for new forms of social organization and action revealed by the mass revolutionary movements. Such thought was also stimulated by the efforts made by Spanish workers and peasants in the development of communist socialist relations in the revolution of 1936-37. In the thirties and forties, theorists once again tried to understand reality with regard to the needs of revolution; we may note here work in political and economic theory by Otto Ruehle, Anton Pannekoek, Paul Mattick, Karl Korsch, and Henryk Grossmann.

With the collapse of the inter-war revolutionary movements, however, and the solution through the second world war of the immediate crisis situation that had begun for world capitalism in 1929, the ideas disappeared with the activities they had been attempts to understand and structure. The result was that the Leninist version of social democratic "orthodox Marxism," now the official ideology of several totalitarian states, survived as representative of Marxist theory. This was challenged only by a professorial, philosophical, "humanist" Marxism, which, drawing inspiration particularly from the works of Marx's youth, made use neither of Marx's analysis of capitalism nor of the consequences to be drawn from it for revolutionary action.

In the East, particularly in the satellite countries, Marx's critique of economics was quite understandably identified as an ideological prop for the Stalinist system. In the West, *Capital* seemed even more out of touch with economic reality than at the turn of the century when Bernstein and his followers had turned their backs on Marxist orthodoxy. The abolition of capitalism in Russia had obviously not resulted in the achievement of workers' power. On the other hand, capitalist society had not evolved in the direction of an obvious polarity between a small group of rich capitalists and a mass of impoverished proletarians, periodically reduced to total destitution by economic crisis. While control over capital has been continually centralized, the small group of the very rich and powerful stand at the top of a continuum of wealth and privilege, in which status and income-level seem to replace class (i.e., relation to the means of production) as the center of analytical interest. Furthermore, the combination of the war with Keynesian policies in peacetime has made possible continuous economic growth and rising incomes for large numbers of workers.

For the twenty-odd years of relative social stability that followed World War II, proponents of the status quo and left-ish critics alike by and large agreed that capitalism had escaped Marx's "iron laws." The basis for economic conflict between workers and bosses was eroded by technological advance and political manipulation of the economy, which together made for permanent prosperity and the satisfaction at least of all material demands. While the official voices of sociology, economics, and political science celebrated this situation as the "end of ideology," however, leftwing pessimists bemoaned it as the advent of a "one dimensional" society, in which no oppositional force was left *but* ideology, in the form of a "critical theory" (or of "cultural revolution"). They agreed with conservatives that material opposition to the system was restricted to the threat posed by the so-called socialist systems of Russia, China, and their allies. Hope for change in the world rested first of all on the peasants of the Third World, though they would find allies in the developed countries among disadvantaged minorities and the student movement. The Leninist character of this picture of the theory-possessing vanguard, deserted by the labor-aristocratic masses, awaiting the commencement of capitalism's destruction at its weakest links, goes far in explaining the apparently bizarre transition in some New Leftists from an interest in "culture" and "liberatory lifestyles" to militaristic guerilla fantasies.

If such views could be crudely labeled "Stalino-humanism," a related but, in my eyes, more interesting set of ideas emerged from the Trotskyist critique of the Soviet Union, which was identified as the vanguard in capitalism's current tendency to monopolization and state regulation. This current (represented variously by *Socialism ou Barbarie*, the English *Solidarity*, *Facing Reality* in Detroit, the group around Murray Bookchin, the Situationist International, and others) revived the earlier ultraleft criticism of Leninism, which was now equated with Marxism. The onset of permanent prosperity was seen as neither a cause for pessimism nor the deathblow to ideology. On the contrary, just by suggesting the possibility of total satisfaction of every desire, modern capitalism —East and West—was bound to produce a conflict between its promise and the restrictions placed on its fulfillment by the institutions of private property and the state. The old conflict between an impoverished working class and a rich ruling class gave way only to expose the deeper, and unsolvable, contradiction between those who control the lives of others and those who are controlled, in a period of history when the end of scarcity made such a division irrational. Again the issues were clearly not "economic" but ones of social and spiritual liberation. Marxism was rejected insofar as it was thought to make this distinction and concentrate on the former.

Both of these leftwing tendencies, along with bourgeois sociology, restricted their appreciation of Marx to his earlier works. The rediscovery of these explorations of "alienation" appealed to those who rejoiced in, as to those who worried about, the cultural malaise that seemed a byproduct of material well-being. But the end of the "permanent prosperity" in the late 1960s; the failure of the "technological revolution" to leave the sphere of armaments production; the increasing assimilation of the conditions and consciousness of the "new," technical and intellectual, working class to those of their blue-collar fellows (including the experience of mass unemployment); and the disintegration of student leftism and the "youth" movement as such have all brought about a renewal of interest in Marx's chief work, the theory of capitalist development.

At the same time, the practical insignificance of the revolutionary Leninist sects and the self-proclaimed reformism of the mass left parties in the West leaves the way open to a rediscovery of the creative possibilities of the working class in a capitalism that is entering once more into visible—painfully visible—crisis. As Marx's theory of economic change is one with his theory of revolution, the renewed interest in *Capital* should go hand in hand with consideration of the associated views about the nature of radical politics. Once again it may be possible to raise the question of the relation of theory to practice, of science to socialism, in a way which does not assume the subservience of the struggle of millions of people to a handful of leaders "armed with Marxist science."

Discussing the utopian socialists, Marx observed that

> So long as the proletariat is not yet sufficiently developed to constitute itself as a class, and consequently so long as the struggle itself of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie has not yet assumed a political character, and the productive forces are not yet sufficiently developed in the bosom of the bourgeoisie itself to enable us to catch a glimpse of the material conditions necessary for the emancipation of the proletariat and for the formation of a new society, these theoreticians are merely utopians who, to meet the wants of the oppressed classes, improvise systems and go in search of a regenerating science. But in the measure that history moves forward, and with it the struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines, they no longer need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece.[17]

Although the current (1979) spirit of the working class is not a revolutionary one, the problems we have today in understanding the nature of revolutionary action do not stem primarily from an unsufficiency of capitalist development or a lack of historical experience of class struggle. In fact, this history offers us more than a supplement to the observation of what is happening before our eyes, as it allows for the detachment from it of concepts and models to aid in the interpretation of present-day events. Such concepts and models cannot provide us with strategy and tactics for the situations we face and will face, but they are essential as an education that helps prepare us for the creativity that revolutionary activity requires.

An understanding of the changing conditions of the workers' movement requires an understanding of its context, the capitalist system. This system has continued to develop and change since *Capital* was written, and in ways which do not receive much attention in Marx's writing, in particular with the increasing participation of the state in economic activity. The new developments require theoretical discussion. How have Keynesian techniques measured up against the limits Marx discovered in the capitalism of his time? Does the carrying of such techniques to their logical conclusion, in the total state domination of the economy in Russia, China, etc., represent a new form of exploitative society? Above all we have to understand the nature of capitalism to define the system we wish to create in its place. For all of these questions, Marx's work remains an essential starting point. By providing us with a developmental model of "pure" capitalism it allows us to judge the significance of the phenomena like monopolization and state-interference in the economy, to see in what sense the party-state-run systems are alternatives to private-property

capitalism, and to pose basic questions about the construction of a system without capital or state.

But *Capital* is not, as it has been taken to be, only a "theory of capitalist development." It is a "critique of political economy"—that is, an exploration of the bases of, and alternatives to, the modes of thought characteristic of life in a society ruled by business. As such it not only "takes note" of our experiences in this system, but, by demonstrating a new way of interpreting them, provides a necessary weapon for the struggle against the system. By showing the roots of capitalist theory in capitalist practice, Marx's theoretical work is a practical tool from which we can learn to organize our own activity in new ways.

It is a remarkable confirmation of Marx's ideas about the relation between social reality and the theories constructed to comprehend it, that the first fifty years of the Marxist movement saw a nearly total failure not only to extend but even to understand Marx's economic writings. Although constant lip-service was paid to *Capital* as the scientific socialist "Bible of the working class," (!) it is fair to say that the publication of Henryk Grossmann's *The Capitalist System's Law of Accumulation and Collapse* in 1929 marked the first serious and knowledgeable attempt to come to grips with Marx's actual work. Since then there have been only a few books of importance, either as exegesis or as extension of Marx's theory. Marx theorized with the assumption of a developed worldwide capitalist system, divided into two classes with the vast majority living as wage-earners. Even an approximation to such a state of affairs—in Europe, North America, and Japan—has only recently come into existence. Until the Great Depression of 1929, every crisis heralded a new prosperity in the course of which the long-term trend of growth would continue. It is only today, when capitalism seems unable (at least in the absence of a third world war) to continue its expansion—externally by rapid development of the Third World, internally by maintenance of a steady growth rate—that the questions Marx raised about the long-term trends have become questions of the hour.

If Marx is now more relevant than ever, the Marxist tradition in which his relics have been enshrined has little to offer us as a guide to understanding, and much to confuse us with. It is necessary, therefore, to go back to *Capital* itself as a starting-point for further progress in analysis. Even apart from the ideological accretions of the last hundred years, however, Marx's works pose certain difficulties for the reader. It must be said that in this matter professional intellectuals have shown no advantage over working-class readers. This is no doubt in part due to the disadvantage of having professional interests incompatible with taking Marx too seriously. But even assuming a desire to understand the world as it is, Marx had to forewarn his readers that "there is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits."[18]

In addition to the difficulty inherent in coming to grips with any abstract theory, particularly one, like Marx's, which asks us to think about a familiar subject matter in a most unfamiliar way, *Capital* presents the reader with a number of problems pecular to what its author called the "method of presentation" of his ideas. First of all, the structure of the argument is such that it is only when all three volumes are read that the whole significance of the first can be seen. Marx ought to have begun with a clear explanation of what he was trying to do and of the method he would employ, but he did not. Secondly, Marx's book looks so much like a work of economic analysis that it has been difficult to remember or to understand the signficance of its original title: critique of political economy. What Marx meant by "critique," and what accordingly the relation of his work to economic theory is, calls for some exposition.

In addition, though "it is generally agreed that Marx was a master of literary German,"[19] his style cannot be called a "popular" or simple one. As he wrote Kugelmann in reference to this problem,

> It is due in part to the abstract nature of the subject-matter, to the limited space prescribed to me, and to the goal of the work.... *Scientific* attempts at the revolutionizing of a science can never be truly popular. But once the scientific foundation is laid, popularization is easy. If the times become somewhat stormier, it will be possible again to choose colors and inks which will cover a popular presentation of *these* subjects.[20]

To date, such a presentation has not been written. The forthcoming series of articles, to which this is an introduction, is not intended to answer this need, but rather to supply enough of the methodological background to enable the reader to deal with Marx's own writing. We will begin with an exploration of Marx's political and intellectual objectives in *Capital* and then see how the form of the argument derives from these. We will end with a discussion of the extent to which Marx achieved his aim—that is, to which his theory can help us organize the overthrow of the current system of social life and the construction of a new one.

Paul Mattick, Jr.



Notes

1. Marx to Arnold Ruge, September 1843, *Karl Marx on Revolution*, ed. Saul K. Padover (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 517-18; original in *Marx-Engels Werke* [henceforth *MEW*] (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959), 1:345.

2. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (NY: International Publishers, 1939), p. 79.

3. Marx, Notes on Bakunin, in *MEW* 18:597-642; cited and trans. Richard N. Hunt, *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), p. 326.

4. Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, pp. 13-14.

5. Marx, *Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850* (NY: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 12, 14, 15.

6. Engels to J. Wedemeyer, 12 April 1853, *Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence* [henceforth *MESC*] (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), p. 94.

7. See Hunt, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-283 and *passim*. In 1874, Engels criticized the Blanquist idea of revolution in these terms: "From Blanqui's conception that every revolution is a surprise attack by a small revolutionary minority, there follows of itself the necessity for a dictatorship after the success of the venture. This would be, to be sure, a dictatorship not of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of the small number who have made the surprise attack and who are themselves previously organized under the dictatorship of one or several individuals" (Engels, "Programm der blanquistischen Kommune-flüchtlinge," in *MEW* 18:529, cited and trans. Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 311).

8. Marx to F. Freiligrath, 29 February 1860, in *MEW* 30:495, cited and trans. Hunt *op. cit.*, p. 283.

9. Marx to J.B. Schweitzer, 13 October 1868, *MESC*, pp. 257-58. Cf. Marx to F. Bolte, 23 November 1871, *MESC*, pp. 326-29, in which the dictum that "the development of socialist sectarianism and that of the real working-class movement always stand in inverse ratio to each other" is illustrated by reference to Proudhon, Lasalle, and Bakunin.

10. Marx, "General Rules of the International Working Men's Association," in *Karl Marx on the First International*, ed. S. Padover (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 13; and "Instructions for Delegates of the Provisional General Council (1866)," *Ibid.*, p. 27. The first of the "General Rules" proclaims the International a medium of "communication and cooperation between working men's societies existing in different countries and aiming at the same end" (*Ibid.*, p. 14).

11. Marx to J.B. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

12. T. Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds. *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1863), pp. 210-11.

13. Marx, *Capital* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 1:104.

14. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Bottmore and Rubel, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

15. Karl Kautsky, cited by V.I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?" in his *Selected Works* (NY: International Publishers, 1967), 1:129-30. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

16. Rosa Luxemburg, "Organizational Question of Social Democracy," in *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks*, ed. Mary-Alice Waters (NY: Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 117-18 and 130.

17. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), p. 125.

18. Marx, *Capital* 1:104.

19. Ben Fowkes, Translator's Preface to *Capital* 1:88.

20. Marx to L. Kugelmann, 28 December 1862, in *Briefe über "Das Kapital"* (Berlin: Deitz Verlag, 1954), p. 114.

REVIEWS

Michael Eldred and Mike Roth, *Guide to Marx's Capital*. London: CSE Books (Conference of Socialist Economists), 1978. 127 pp. $2.00.

A brief handbook for *Capital* study-groups, such as this wishes to be, would be very useful. I am sorry to say that this book does not meet the need. It is made up of five essays on basic themes of Marx's three volumes, supplemented by a glossary of "145 key terms and concepts." Unfortunately, this structure—even more than the difficult prose—makes the book practically unreadable. The essays use the "key terms" without explaining them, sending the reader at almost every sentence to the glossary, where the terms are not so much defined as interrelated. As each definition merely refers the reader backward or forward to other definitions, one soon is happy to abandon this pillar-to-post chase for the relatively straightforward discussion in *Capital* itself. Furthermore, six pages are covered with a series of inscrutable charts pointlessly illustrating Volume II's reproduction schemata, thus thoroughly mystifying a relatively simple matter.

The content is no better than the form. To take a crucial example, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall—the center of Marx's crisis theory—is presented briefly side-by-side with a "class struggle" theory of crisis ("the laborers' strong demands make capital sick by threatening its valorization") quite foreign to Marx's actual argument in *Capital*. Out of 95 pages of exposition, 22 are devoted to a discussion of "the ways in which," according to Marx, "capital requires science and stimulates its development"—certainly a minor issue in a brief introduction. Four pages take on the question whether Marx's use of "*der Arbeiter*" (worker as a masculine noun) represents a theory-crippling sexism.

In short: if there is to be a renaissance of *Capital*-study, this book will be no aid to it.

—*Paul Mattick, Jr.*

Nancy Chodorow. *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. 261 pp.

The last ten years have seen much attention devoted to analysis and critique of the sexual division of labor. Especially singled out for critical discussion has been women's unique role in the rearing of children—what has traditionally been called "mothering." In this book Nancy Chodorow has set herself the task of explaining "the reproduction of mothering," that is, how it comes to be that girls, unlike boys, grow up desiring to become the primary parents in their children's upbringing, with the major responsibility for care and nurturance, physical and emotional. Of course such generalizations ignore variations, both between different families in one society and between different societies. Chodorow claims, however, that these generalizations are by and large true, and that the explanation resides in phenomena which are characteristic of all hitherto existing societies. It is, in fact, to the mother-child relationship that she looks for understanding. She claims that a situation in which women are the primary caretakers of children has its own psychological dynamic which leads to its reproduction in the next generation. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in a paper presenting an earlier version of her argument,[1] Chodorow limited herself to discussing the implications of women's child-rearing role for psychological differences between the sexes. In the book under discussion she extends her argument, in what I regard as an unfortunate manner, in an attempt to provide an *explanation* of the social phenomenon of women's mothering in terms of its internal psychological dynamics.

Chodorow begins by considering the main explanations that have been previously proposed for women's primary responsibility for child-rearing. There have been many variants of explanations in terms of speculative biology. All of these theories, she thinks, are based on fallacious arguments or insufficient evidence. For instance, some research suggests that male hormones may have some influence on the differential behavior of the sexes. However, the evidence is inconclusive and also suggests that experiential factors are the dominant ones in the development of behavioral gender differences. Again, arguments based on the adaptive advantages of women's child-rearing in hunter-gatherer societies generalize this to other societies without presenting any serious argument. Many psychoanalysts have proposed variants of a drive to mother after giving birth, but their arguments are usually based on speculation and biased clinical evidence which itself is, in any case, open to multiple interpretations. All in all, the biologically oriented theorists generally present arguments based more on ideology than on evidence. On the other hand, it does not seem surprising that in societies where women must breastfeed their children and where child-bearing consumes a major portion of most women's lives (which after all, was the situation everywhere until quite recently) women have been given primary responsibility for children's upbringing. It is true, as Chodorow claims, that breastfeeding does not *require* that women raise children, but this does not mean that a sophisticated psychological theory is required to understand that they do: I believe that Chodorow has overextended the range of her thesis, and thus weakened her argument.

Chodorow's argument against the theories of role-training

and indoctrination is less clear, perhaps because she fails to make clear exactly which ideas she is criticizing. She attacks "the conventional feminist view, drawn from social or cognitive psychology, which understands feminine development as explicit ideological instruction or formal coercion" (p. 33) for failing to realize that adequate mothering requires that the mother "*to some degree* and *on some unconscious or conscious level*, has the capacity and sense of self as maternal" (p. 33, emphasis in original). Thus, explanations based on behavioral conformity and indoctrination cannot explain why women want to mother, which is essential to the successful carrying out of their task. Chodorow thus correctly focuses attention on a hitherto ignored aspect of the problem, namely, how the development of women's subjectivity helps reproduce the social arrangement in which women mother.

Chodorow's own approach to the problem of the reproduction of motherhood is based on the object-relations school of psychoanalytic theory. Developed in Britain over the last 30 years by Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Michael and Alice Balint, this approach has only recently begun to exert some influence, in a modified form, on American psychoanalytic circles. Unlike orthodox Freudians, the object-relations theorists have been less concerned with studying the vicissitudes of the instinctual drives (libido and aggression) and have concentrated attention on the growing child's internalization of his or her relationships to the parents and especially the relationship to the mother in early infancy. Some of these theorists eschew drive theory altogether, while others still nod in its direction while in fact formulating their theories in other terms. While object-relations theory is similar to the American neo-Freudian school in its concentration on interpersonal relationships, it differs in considering unconscious and fantasy relationships to be as important as real ones in the formation of the personality. Thus, it is not only the actual treatment of the child by other people that is important, but also how the child, consciously and unconsciously, construes these relationships. For example, it is likely that in some cases at least the horrible stories of maltreatment by their families that schizophrenics often tell, and that had such a strong influence on students of the families of schizophrenics such as R.D. Laing, not memories of real childhood relationships but fantasies developed due to the pre-schizophrenic child's being, for some reason, unable to make use of the love and attention given to her or him by the parents.

The other modification of psychoanalytic theory undertaken by the object-relations school is to place increased emphasis on the dyadic mother-infant relationship of early life instead of the traditional emphasis on the triadic, "oedipal" relationship between mother, father, and child that is presumed to occur between ages four and six. Freud's theory, focused on the oedipal period, dealt with neurotic conflicts, i.e., conflicts internal to the person, such as the obsessive-compulsive conflict, in which a person may feel compelled to avoid stepping on the cracks of a sidewalk in order to prevent catastrophe, even though he or she is aware that this fear is groundless. In recent years, more attention has been devoted to problems which involve a diffuse feeling of difficulty in living. Therapists today are more likely to perceive their patients as suffering from global feelings of something being not quite right, of general emptiness and boredom, and of vague depression and anxiety which cannot be attributed to specific causes. The classic description of a rather extreme form of this kind of patient is R.D. Laing's *The Divided Self* which describes the so-called schizoid person who is unable to feel "real" and connected to his or her activity in the world. The cause of this change in therapeutic attention is unclear; relevant factors may be a change in the selection of patients, changes in social structure, revision of therapeutic techniques, and modifications in the theoretical conceptions of therapists. In any case, this change in the prototypical patient has been accompanied by changes in psychoanalytic theory. Modern analytic theory works on the assumption that the problems of the contemporary patient are more likely to arise during the early (so-called preoedipal) relationship with the mother, when a primal sense of self was formed. This has led to many attempts to theorize about this early "first relationship" of which object-relations theory was the forerunner and, perhaps, the most influential variant.

Though it may constitute a beginning, object-relations theory has not formed an adequate account of human development. One of its greatest weaknesses is its lack of any detailed account of psychic structure. Traditional Freudian concepts such as id, ego, and superego, which are metaphoric attempts at describing psychological functioning, are dropped or reduced in importance, but nothing takes their place. This results in hidden appeals to common-sense and vague metaphors which are never examined. Thus, writers of this school are often extremely imprecise in their use of such fundamental concepts as "internalization," "fantasy," "object-relationship," etc. They often use verbal tricks which cover over their lack of clarity through the use of such undefined concepts as "maturation," "love," and "whole person," which carry us along with their suggestive power, but which ultimately need to be either made more precise or dispensed with. I agree with Chodorow that object-relations theory is one of the most promising developments in psychoanalytic and psychological theory, but I feel that it shares many of the faults of other psychoanalytic schools and that fundamentally new theoretical directions will ultimately have to be taken. Probably this will involve an integration of psychoanalytic clinical insights with work on cognitive development like that of Piaget, and with the observational work on child development being done by developmental psychologists. However, no one has so far been able to achieve this desired integration, and we are forced to continue working with partial theories in order to determine how useful they are in dealing with various problems.

As the foregoing account of object-relations theory suggests, Chodorow's discussion of feminine psychology and the reproduction of mothering relies heavily on an analysis of the infant's first relationship to another person, which in most situations consists of a tie to a female "mother"—whether she is in fact the biological mother or another woman. She adduces much evidence—both clinical and social-psychological—that boys and girls experience relationship to the mother differently during all phases of development. These differential experiences, she argues, provide a psychological basis for the sexual division of labor in adulthood, and, in particular, for the fact that women usually perform most of the childrearing functions. My summary of her presentation will be little better than a caricature of her subtle and nuanced argument, which relies on data from many different sources and approaches. She avoids the trap fallen into by many of the others who have dealt with these questions (e.g., Juliet Mitchell in *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*), who seem to believe that the truth can be



found simply through arguing about the interpretation of texts (be they those of Freud, Lacan, or the latest guru) without confronting the texts with the facts that they are intended to help us understand. Similarly, she avoids the position which says that data collected outside of a laboratory and unaccompanied by elaborate statistics is of no interest.

Much clinical psychoanalytic evidence suggests that the mother-daughter tie is usually characterized by identification and merging which is more prolonged and intense than that between the mother and her son. The mother tends not to consider the daughter to be a separate person, but an aspect of herself. In technical terms, there are "patterns of fusion, projection, narcissistic extension, and denial of separation" which "are more likely to happen in early mother-daughter relationships than in those of mothers and sons" (p. 103). This treatment by the mother makes it difficult for the daughter to recognize herself as a separate person. She instead perceives herself as a part of, or an extension of her mother. This mode of relating to her mother is later generalized to other aspects of the world. In contrast, Chodorow suggests that the young son is more likely to experience himself as the *object* of his mother's fantasies and desires. The boy's experience of his mother will tend to catapult him into "oedipal" conflicts regarding gender identity and gender differences earlier than the girl.

As well as these differences in the early preoedipal mother-infant relationship, the differential treatment of boys and girls continues into the oedipal phase when, as already indicated, issues regarding the differences between the sexes and the formation of gender identity are dominant. The classical psychoanalytic problem concerning female development during this phase is to explain why it is that the girl turns from the mother to the father (and other men) as object of her desires, both sensual and affectional. It is to solve this problem that the concepts of penis envy and women as castrated people were introduced (as well as to explain clinical evidence of unconscious desires for a penis in adult women patients). As is well known, these ideas have raised a storm of controversy and have become a focal point of discussion among the various psychoanalytic approaches to feminine psychology. Some authors, e.g., Helene Deutsch, claim that penis envy is an inevitable "psychological consequence of the anatomical distinction between the sexes," while members of the culturalist school claim that penis envy is a result of the girl's desire for the greater power of the male in a patriarchal society, and that the oedipal girl's turn toward her father is a result of an inborn heterosexuality. Both these positions thus end up with biological explanations for feminine heterosexuality.

Chodorow's idea is that it is the constraining nature of the

preoedipal mother-daughter relationship which leads the girl to turn to the father in an attempt to escape from remaining a narcissistic extension of her mother in order to become a self in her own right. The penis is desired by the girl because it is a symbol of the desired independence. Quoting the French psychoanalyst Chassequet-Smirgel: "Basically, penis envy is the symbolic expression of another desire. Women do not wish to become men, but want to detach themselves from the mother and become complete, autonomous *women*." (p. 123, emphasis in original). Meanwhile, as Chodorow's reading of social psychological literature suggests, the father has probably been acting seductively toward the girl and encouraging her to act in a "feminine" manner.

The girl does not abandon interest in the mother while this turn toward the father is occurring. She is still intimately involved with the mother, though in complex ways that can not be gone into here. One important result is that in girls, unlike boys, the oedipal phase tends to be a prolonged process which is never really resolved. This helps explain differences in the male and female experiences of adolescence. The adolescent girl is more likely to remain emotionally involved with her mother and to experience conflicts regarding dependence on and separateness from her than is the adolescent boy.

One important result of the girl's path to development is that she will emerge as an adult woman with a greater ability to experience another's desires and conflicts as her own—that is, for "empathy"—than most men, who did not have the experience of being considered an extension of their mother. Furthermore, due to the nature of girls' early ties to their mothers, they "come to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object-world and as differently oriented to their inner object-world as well" (p. 167). Chodorow discusses specific aspects of the developmental history of boys that make it difficult for them to experience those continuous, merging ways of relating to the world. It is these states of merging with and empathy for others that are important in caring for young children, and are involved in the derivation of pleasure from this activity. The seeds of this caring are created in both boys and girls by their early experiences of being cared for by a loving mother. However, the vicissitudes of development that we have sketched above and that Chodorow discusses in detail suggest why women are more likely to become mothers.

These differences in personality are also involved in the wider realm of the sexual division of labor. It is typical of our society and most other existent societies that women tend to play a preponderant role in familial life and affective matters while men are largely concerned with nonfamilial production. Chodorow cites Michele Rosaldo who suggests that in all societies

> feminine roles are less public or "social," . . . they exhibit less linguistic and institutional differentiation, and that the interaction they involve is more likely to be kin-based and to cross generations, whereas man's interaction remains within a single generation and cuts across kin units on the basis of universalistic categories. . . . Women's role in the home and primary definition in social reproductive, sex-gender terms are characterized by particularism, concern with affective goals and ties, and a diffuse, unbounded quality. Masculine occupational roles and men's primary definition in the sphere of production are universalistically defined and recruited, and are less likely to involve affective considerations (p. 180).

The division of labor has social and psychic costs, as well as contradictions leading toward its abolition. In her brief appendix entitled "Women's Mothering and Women's Liberation" Chodorow claims that:

> the sexual division of labor and women's responsibility for child care are linked to and generate male dominance. Psychologists have demonstrated unequivocally that the very fact of being mothered by women generates in men conflicts over masculinity, a psychology of male dominance, and a need to be superior to women. . . . Thus the social organization of parenting produces sexual inequality not simply role differentiation. It is politically and socially important to confront this organization of parenting. Even though it is an arrangement that seems universal, directly rooted in ideology, and inevitable, it can be changed. The possibility of change is indicated not only by a theoretical critique of biological determinism, but by the contradictory aspects of the present organization of parenting. Even as the present forms reproduce mothering, they help to produce a widespread dissatisfaction with their own limitations among women (and sometimes men) (p. 214).

Chodorow only hints at what these contradictory aspects are. She suggests that the recent nuclear family arrangement in which a lone woman has almost sole responsibility for taking care of her children tends to produce a situation in which the mother is both overinvolved with, and profoundly ambivalent about her children. This, in turn, has psychic consequences for them. Further tension is induced as women increasingly enter the paid labor force, but are still expected to maintain primary responsibility for the care of their children. These tensions can produce efforts toward the transformation of the system of exclusive female mothering, but Chodorow does not really say much about what could or should replace it, except for a brief nod at experiments with collective childrearing a la the kibbutzim, China, and Cuba, which she claims indicate that children so reared show "more sense of solidarity and commitment to the group, less individualism and competitiveness, are less liable to form intense, exclusive adult relationships than children reared in Western nuclear families" (p. 217). It is atypical that Chodorow gives no reference for this assertion, which, in the case of China and Cuba, at least, is probably based on the impressionistic accounts of the revolutionary groupies who can interpret every attempt of a "Communist" state to control its population as a victory for human liberation. Other observers have interpreted the same character traits as signs of a "totalitarian" destruction of the individual and of a strong sense of self. It is not at all clear that the problem of the relations of the individual and the collectivity will be solved under socialism simply by replacing the conformist individualism of contemporary capitalism by conformist collectivism. Hopefully, the changed social conditions of a socialist revolution will lead to a revision in the way this question is formulated. At present, most discussion of this question is largely a matter of value judgments, which is probably the result of our lack of adequate social experience and the appropriate theoretical concepts to deal with it. It remains an open question to what extent psychoanalytic categories will be useful in this analysis. In any case, Chodorow does come out for the equal participation of women and men in childrearing, which would significantly alter the typical pattern of child development outlined in this book.

These questions point to the greatest weakness in Chodorow's book. She recognizes that changes in family and social

structure should result in modifications in the basic pattern of differences in male and female child development. However, the question remains as to what aspects of the psychoanalytic theory and clinical material she relies on so heavily will turn out to be inappropriate for dealing with human development in societies basically different from those in which it was developed and perhaps even for different social classes in our society. This is especially important because Chodorow relies heavily on the analysis of detailed clinical reports, all of which are from Western societies, and most of which are of people from middle and upper class backgrounds. Thus we need to know if the patterns of differences between mother-daughter and mother-son relationships that she describes as typical of our society hold up in detailed studies of lower social classes and of other societies. This would require clinical study capable of unearthing details of psychic development for people in other classes and cultures comparable to those that psychoanalytic clinical work provides for middle- and upper-class individuals in our own society. Reliance on sociological data is not sufficient. My own view is that the broad outlines of psychoanalytic theory will prove useful in this task, but it remains to be seen what modifications this theory will require. As I indicated in my discussion of object-relations theory, I feel that psychoanalytic theory needs to be modified in order adequately to conceptualize psychic reality in our own culture. These difficulties regarding the extent of applicability of the theory are not Chodorow's alone, and may even be inherent in the project of applying psychoanalytic insights to cross-cultural subjects. What is needed is not an end to such attempts, but an awareness of their dangers.

This book is, in my opinion, one of the best attempts to apply psychoanalytic concepts to the understanding of social phenomena. However, it shares with all works of this genre the characteristic of being stronger on intuitive plausibility than on solid proof of its hypotheses. In this light we should keep in mind Chodorow's own reservations as presented in the earlier version of her argument mentioned above:

> In a formulation of this preliminary nature, there is not a great body of consistent evidence to draw upon. Available evidence is presented that illuminates aspects of the theory —for the most part psychoanalytic and social-psychological accounts based almost entirely on highly industrialized Western society [and on the middle and upper classes in that society, S.S.]. . . . [T]his is in some sense a programmatic appeal to people doing research. It points to certain issues that might be especially important in investigations of child development and family relationships, and suggests that researchers look explicitly at female vs. male development, and that they consider seriously mother-daughter relationships even if these are not of obvious "structural importance" in a traditional anthropological view of that society.[2]

As an appeal for further research in these areas, this book is extremely effective. It would be a great mistake, however, if its hypothesis were to be accepted by others as proven and as evidence for other ideas. Too much of radical social thinking already rests unawares on what are simply plausible hypotheses.

Stephen Soldz

Notes

1. Nancy Chodorow, "Family Structure and Feminine Personality" in Michele Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., *Woman, Culture, and Society* Stanford, 1974.
2. *Ibid.* p. 45.

LETTERS

Dear *Root & Branch*,

The following comments have been assembled by your faithful *Red-eye* correspondent. They are drawn from discussions we have had on your recent publication..

(1) The article "Are We Headed for Another Depression?" summarizes a basic framework of analysis which we essentially agree with. However, we feel there are areas which have been neglected, and which should receive more attention in a review of the current crisis:

First of all, the analysis remains within the context of the "boom-bust" cycle. No substantial connection is made between war and depression, other than a reference to heightened competition on the world market. The probability of war thus appears indeterminate—as though it could occur at any moment in the cycle. In this century, war production and world war have played a specific role as the "resolution" of the last resort to capitalist crises. War-time devaluation (running old plant into the ground with little reinvestment) and deflation (which cheapens the cost of constant capital and living labor-power), and physical destruction of masses of fixed capital, clear the ground for a renewed cycle of accumulation at a lower value-composition. Also, world war completes the counter-revolution by militarizing society. The likelihood of war increases with the growing impossibility of recovery by "peaceful" means (e.g., traditional means of artificially "stimulating" the economy). We think that war is most likely to break out at the pit of the depression, following the failure of the state's attempts to resume domestic production under its direction. At this point, the state will be forced to seek new sources of surplus value elsewhere, leading to conflicts with competing national capitals (e.g., it was only after the New Deal backfired that the U.S. got into WWII).

No mention is made of the contradictory function of credit (as fictitious value), which deepens the crisis by exacerbating inflation, while at the same time delaying and buffering its impact. The fantastic expansion of credit in recent years is a significant feature of the current crisis, as is the financial structure of modern capitalism as a whole (e.g., institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have played a key role in the global capitalist "management" of the crisis).

By focusing on the level of total social capital, evidence of various capitalist "strategies" are ignored. For example, there are subtler new ways to reduce costs of reproducing the labor force, and to weaken the resistance of workers to bearing the burdens of the crisis. In France for instance, there is a significant growth in the so-called "secondary" labor market (temporary workers and the like who have no job security, don't receive pensions, unemployment benefits, etc.). In Italy, there is a tendency to "decentralize" industry in sectors where workers have actively opposed wage-freezes and speed-ups.

This brings us to the next point: the relation of class struggle to the crisis. In the long run, there is little to gain from more or less isolated resistance to decreasing living standards and deteriorating working conditions. Nonetheless, workers' struggles do force concessions from the bourgeoisie, and this affects the course of the crisis (although it doesn't change its ultimate cause or resolution). For example, the substantial wage-increases won by the TGWU truckdrivers in England after their strike shut down the country will force a rise in inflation. The extended coal strike in this country last year had repercussions that extended well beyond the coal fields. In Carter's 1976 energy policy, use of coal was urged to help offset trade imbalances that were attributed to the surge in cost of imported oil. The coal strike was a blow to this "plan," and helped depress the dollar in the world money market, which was carefully watching U.S. trade figures. Also, although this is difficult to determine, it is more than likely that the coal workers' resistance to the productivity increases envisaged by the energy policy gave impetus to the nuclear option. The economic implications of investments in the highly capital intensive nuclear industry are obvious. Finally, the instability in the Appalachian coalfields also gave impetus to the development of Western coal sources. In this region, labor is less organized, and most of the coal is strip-mined..

A small but vitally important error was made in the presentation of Marx's theory of the falling rate of profit: "Marx argued that the fundamental cause of the decline in the rate of profit is that the *amount of capital* invested in capitalist enterprises tends to increase at a faster rate than the *number of workers employed*." Marx's formulation for the organic composition of capital (c/v) and for the rate of surplus value (s/c+v) are *value* formulations. c/v should be read as the value of constant capital divided by the value of variable capital, and s/c+v should be read as the surplus value divided by the value of the constant capital plus the value of the variable capital. Variable capital or v should be understood as the value of labor power times the number of workers employed, not merely as the number of workers alone. This must be true if we are to be consistent on just an arithmetical level. Otherwise we are adding and dividing apples and oranges and our results cannot be stated in strictly value terms. But this is not merely a mathematical quibble. It is unfair to Marx to present his theory incorrectly (it would put you in the notoriously bad company of the traditional and vulgar Marxists), but more importantly we have a stronger basis for understanding the present crisis and the possibility of communist transformation if we ground our analysis of capital firmly on Marx's value theory, i.e., the theory of alienated activity, which is the basis of the capitalist mode of production and capitalist social relations.

(2) On the article "Authority and Democracy in the U.S.": p. 13 reads "As far as the working-class was concerned insofar as its interests found articulation at all, it was satisfied with the war-given opportunity to secure jobs and higher wages." In fact, according to Andrew Levinson (in his book, *The Working Class Majority*) opinion polls in 1964 indicated that blue-collar workers were probably more "anti-war" than any of the other higher "status groups." In 1970, 48.9 percent of the working-class were for immediate withdrawal, or withdrawal within 18 months. In November 1966, voters in Dearborn, Michigan, a solidly working-class area, voted two to one against the war effort. This may not be typical of working-class sentiment at the time, but the statement in the article seems inaccurate at worst, and superficial at best.

(3) On the *Root & Branch* statement that appeared in the last two issues:

(a) *Red-eye* holds the position that the "socialist" countries are state-capitalist, insofar as (1) these countries are subject to the law of value and the falling rate of profit; (2) they are increasingly integrated into the world market; and (3) they are class societies; the ruling class fulfills the function of capitalists insofar as it oversees the production and allocation of surplus-value via the wage system. Referring to them as "state-run" or "state-run analogs" begs the question of how and why these nations are just as "bankrupt" as the "Capitalist west."

(b) Certainly, social revolution is not inevitable, and there does not exist in the world today a movement capable of accomplishing the communist transformation of society. But "communism is for us not a stable state which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which

abolishes the present state of things" (Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*). As such it exists as a present tendency when proletarians are forced to unite against submission to the world of commodities and value. We could speak for example of the communist tendency which is expressed in struggles such as the wildcat at Fleetwood that John Lippert describes in some detail in issue 11:15 of *Radical America*. Lippert writes of a kind of excitement and inspiration produced by the sense of community that developed among the wildcatting autoworkers.

"There can be no revolutionary movement except in periods of revolution." What does this mean? What qualifies as a revolutionary movement? Aren't we part of the revolutionary movement, as limited as it is at this point? And what qualifies as a "period of revolution"? It seems that you are saying that a revolutionary period exists only when a revolutionary movement exists, and vice versa. In this case, the statement is tautological.

"What defines and unites the working class is its exploitation by capital." Again, here the working-class is presented as separate from communism. What defines the working class is also the fact that it is the historical agent of communism (the power to transform society rests in its hands).

(c) Although you refer to the bankruptcy of modern society as a worldwide phenomenon, you do not speak explicitly of international revolution. We think it is important to make it clear that communist revolution implies the abolition of national boundaries.

(d) "The working class must take direct responsibility for what it already produces." Should it take responsibility to produce nuclear plants, T.V. dinners, and plastic flowers? This is much too limited a statement. The proletariat can no more simply take over the existing productive apparatus to use it for its own purposes, than it can take over the existing state machine and use it for its own purposes. Value and the logic of profit impose a certain type of production, develop some branches and neglect others. Plants will have to be converted, resources allocated differently, conditions in workplaces improved, etc. Decisions will have to be made about what to produce and how, based on the assessment of the needs of the global community that will emerge from the transformation of existing relations of production.

(e) "Our goal is that of workers' control over social life." Again, this is limited and in our opinion incorrect. Insofar as today it is wage-labor (the social relation which is at the origin of value, surplus value, etc.) that defines the worker as a separate social category, and work itself as alienated human activity, the abolition of wage-labor implies the abolition of the worker and work *as so defined* (This obviously does not mean the end of productive activity which is painful and boring. The point is not to quibble about the meaning of words, but to emphasize the transformation of relations between people and their activity in producing-reproducing the conditions of their existence.)

I realize that many of the points raised here require further clarification and discussion (not to speak of the rather tedious style). Our intention is not to present you with some final, rigid statement of ourposition, but rather to initiate discussion of our ideas.

Greetings,
Sylvia P. for Red-eye
20 May 1979

(1) "Mose" Responds:

First of all, thank you for your thoughtful comments. From what I can tell, we have no serious disagreements about the essential nature of the current crisis of world capitalism, or about the likely course of events in the near future. At most, we have a difference of emphasis here and there. Let me respond to the issues you have raised.

(1) *The connection between war and depression.* As I said in the article, the coming depression will no doubt intensify the rivalry among nations and, thus, increase the probability of another world war. Beyond that, I don't think much more can be said. The role of the wartime destruction of capital in preparing the ground for another upswing, although important in the last two world wars, will be irrelevant this time around. Since the next war will be a nuclear one, the destruction will be so total that no "post-war recovery" will be possible.

(2) *The contradictory function of credit.* I agree with you that the tremendous expansion of credit during the "post-war boom" is a significant feature of the current crisis. In retrospect, I think that I should have at least mentioned the role of credit expansion in postponing the depression and in making the eventual depression even worse. This is a complicated subject and I wish I understood it better myself. For example, how does the current expansion of credit compare with other periods of prosperity? Is capitalism "more leveraged" now than in the 1920s? (I think so.) Also, more theoretically, what can we say about the *limits* to the expansion of credit? You mention inflation and this is no doubt important. What are other limits? If you have written anything along these lines, please send it along.

(3) *New strategies for cutting wages.* I don't understand your criticism here. I discussed explicitly how capitalists attempt to raise their profit rates by cutting wages and gave a few examples of their strategies in the 1970s. I am sure we could go on at some length with such examples. My main point was that no matter how successful these strategies might be in cutting wages, they will not succeed in raising the rate of profit enough to generate another round of capital accumulation. That requires a significant destruction of the existing capital.

(4) *The relation of the class struggle to the crisis.* Certainly workers' struggles affect the course the crisis will take. But workers' struggles did not cause the current crisis and workers' struggles will not end the current crisis unless those struggles are directed against the foundations of capitalism itself. As long as workers take for granted their position as *wage-laborers* and struggle only to improve their conditions as wage-laborers (i.e., fight for more jobs, higher wages, etc.), then these struggles will not be successful anymore, except here and there for a few workers, for a short period of time. In a period of crisis, capitalism is not able to satisfy even the modest demands for no further deterioration of living standards. If the increasing misery which capitalism has in store for us is to be avoided, then capitalism itself must be abolished, root and branch.

(5) *Definition of the organic composition of capital.* The reason I defined the organic composition of capital as the ratio of the total capital invested to the number of workers employed (rather than as the ratio of constant capital to variable capital) is that I thought this definition would make it easier for most readers to understand Marx's explanation of the falling rate of profit without getting bogged down in a lot of definitions and unfamiliar concepts. The purpose of my article was to *introduce* Marx's theory as an explanation of the current crisis and of the means and likelihood of recovery. I was not attempting to provide a rigorous, comprehensive analysis of the current crisis. I just wanted to call attention to the main point of Marx's crisis theory —that a return to prosperity is highly unlikely without a prior depression characterized by the widespread bankruptcy of capitalist firms. You might be right that my lack of rigor will only confuse people in the long run; but, that has not been my experience so far.

(2) Mattick Replies:

With respect to "Authority and Democracy": Whatever one or another opinion poll may turn up, workers expressed *in their actions* no dissatisfaction with the war. There were no strikes by war workers, or anti-war strikes by other workers, even in response to the massive student strike of 1970. Aside from the working-class youths who objected to their experience as cannon fodder, the anti-war movement was from first to last a student and "middle class" movement.

(3) On the Root & Branch Statement:

With respect to the *Root & Branch* Statement, we appreciate the close reading and thoughtful criticism.

(a) The Statement begs the question of the nature of the state-run systems purposely. We are not of one mind on this question as a group—nor are some of us as individuals too! We are pretty much agreed that, apart from their involvement in the world market, these systems cannot be said to be subject to the law of value. "Value" as a concept applies only to private capital market systems; in Russia *et al.* its role as "regulator" of the economy is taken by central planning. For this reason, it is inappropriate to speak here of "surplus value" or "rate of profit." A statement of principles did not seem the place to discuss in detail these complex and thorny issues, which are in any case of secondary importance politically (since we are for the overthrow of the party-state whether or not its exploitation of labor is to be analyzed in terms of "value"). We welcome articles on this matter.

(b) If there were a "real *movement*" for communism, rather than just the "excitement and inspiration" of workers in one struggle or another, we would see communism as more than an idea shared by a handful of would-be participants in revolution such as ourselves. Despite the appearance of circularity in our dictum on revolutionary movements, we meant, firstly, to distinguish situations in which "opposition to commodities and value" arises, through a "total break with . . . the relation between wage-labor and capital," from the class struggle which, whatever its ebbs and flows, has been a constant feature of capitalism. Secondly, we meant to emphasize the apparent impossibility, in the light of historical experience, of creating mass organizations in *preparation* for revolutionary action. As long as socialism exists only as an idea in some people's heads, the working class is separate from communism. To affirm otherwise threatens the identification of our ideas with the movement, an identification which has been an ideological underpinning of vanguardism. It is important to remember that revolutionaries represent themselves, not the class. We can say—and we think this is the truth in Marx's statement and in your remarks—that capitalism generates tendencies in the direction of communist movements; we wish to stress that these represent possibilities that workers may realize, and not actualities outside of our analyses. The working class up to now has been defined by capital: it must *redefine itself* in terms of communism, by actually moving to the seizure and utilization of the means of production.

(c) Your suggestion to spell out the necessity of internationalism is a good one.

(d) While the state machine is useful for no socialist purpose, unfortunately there is no other productive apparatus to take over but the existing one. To take responsibility for its use does not mean—as we should make clear—continuing its present uses or forms. It means being in a position to make choices. The working class, if it takes social power, will have to decide whether or not to produce nukes, TV dinners, and plastic flowers. It seems obvious that, as you suggest, many changes will be made, both in what is produced and in how. A statement of principles, again, does not seem to us the place to speculate on what these changes might be.

(e) As you say, in capitalism the character of work and the social category of worker are defined by wage-labor. Work—pleasant and unpleasant—will need to be performed after as before capitalism, and those who do it will still be workers. What will be abolished are the social niches of those who *do no work* other than to organize the extraction of surplus-labor from others. This is what we meant to emphasize; we did not mean to suggest that "work" and "worker" will mean the same under communism as they do today.

We hope this exchange of views will be a prelude to a fuller discussion of these and other issues! Meanwhile, we have found your suggestions helpful and will make use of them in revising our statement.

On Ulli Diemer's "Anarchism vs. Marxism"

Some marxists in recent years have expended a lot of energy telling us how much they have been influenced by anarchism. They tell us the "True Marx" is not at all what his present followers say he is. They call themselves "Libertarian Marxists" (which I'll abbreviate with "L-M"). L-Ms purport to feel there are many points of unity with anarchists, which should lead us to join together in organization. Of course, only "good" anarchists need apply. To define the anarchist they want, they dig up the dusty old polemic between Marx and Bakunin. Somehow, they feel this debate is of central importance to present-day relations between marxists and anarchists.

To start with, most "libertarian" marxists reject nearly all in marxism since Marx: Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro, and all the present-day marxism which is practiced upon nearly two-thirds of the world's population. But they do not reject Marx; they "transcend" him, yet follow him at the same time. If that concept sounds a bit too mystical for you, wait, there's more. Like calvinists against the Pope, L-Ms try to reinterpret the "ancient texts" to show how Marx himself (!) was really a libertarian. Ulli Diemer (in *Root & Branch* 7) has baldly asserted: "Marx is without dispute (?) the central figure in the development of liberatarianism." L-Ms dismiss as irrelevant the fact that marxism is today one of the most authoritarian dogmas ever to inflict humanity. I have yet to see anything attributed to Marx which justifies his importance to anarchists.

L-Ms plaintively complain that anarchists are unfair in that the marxism we attack has little to do with Marx. Even if we admit this, why should our criticism of marxism have anything more to do with Marx than marxism has to do with Marx? If we analyze society as it is today, then we must criticize marxism as it is today. Marxism today is a part of contemporary culture everywhere in the world, as much as is freudianism and capitalism. So any analysis of society or discussion of strategy must develop with the possibility that marxism will be criticized. But Marx himself need never be mentioned.

L-Ms, as much as they'd like to, can't have it both ways: they can't complain anarchism has no valid historical alternative to show and then complain of descriptions and analyses of the experience of the Spanish Revolution (among other experiences). They are bored by such things, presumably preferring to contemplate the "New Man" and how the millenium (read "The Capitalist Crisis") is at hand. Christians have been waiting for 2000 years. I hope L-Ms won't match that record! They have "Found It" in Marx, and through Him, they will be reborn in New Men. Good luck!

L-Ms are correct, though, in their assertion that we anarchists often criticize marxism, leninism, stalinism, and maoism as though they were identical. In fact, I wouldn't stop there: many of those elements we criticize are also contained in other governing doctrines. The identity we see rests precisely upon those elements in those tendencies which are identical or similar.

Let's deal specifically with the Bakunin-Marx debate which so fascinates L-Ms. The extreme pyramiding of power, the ideological monolithism, the separation between ruler and ruled, the destruction of the most basic freedoms and rights all combine to give Bakunin's warnings to his polemic with Marx a prophetic character. Marxists, failing to take into account Bakunin's warnings, have everywhere created the opposite of the paradise predicted by Marx. L-Ms complain that Bakunin deliberately fabricated the accusation that Marx proposed a "People's State." Is it only accidental that 99 percent of all marxists in the world have taken their cue from Bakunin's "fabrication" rather than from the "True Marx" himself, as they build their marxist states? L-Ms must admit Marx called upon the proletariat to use the state apparatus. Squirm as you might, "state apparatus" has always meant "state" in marxist practice. The anarchist analysis of power, based upon the written evidence of thousands of years, shows few instances of "state apparatus" being put aside once assumed. Show me a marxist revolution which has even the most tentative of plans to put aside the state apparatus, much less ever having done so!

L-Ms try to pretty up "dictatorship of the proletariat" with three paragraphs by Rosa Luxemburg tortuously trying to show how a "dictatorship" is really some form of "pure democracy" (more mysticism here). Why call it a "dictatorship"? What is the significance of the use of the term? Perhaps sloppy thinking on Marx's part? Did "dictatorship" mean something other than dictatorship in those bygone days?

is marxist analytical power so mystically great that they see something in dictatorship the rest of us miss? Or do their thought-convolutions on this issue show confusion of thought on the part of marxists? Again, we need to deal with the historical reality and not with the L-Ms' ideal of perfection.

L-Ms excuse the confused and sloppy thinking of Marx by asserting (usually by a quote from Engels, and not Marx at all) that Marx did not mean "economic determinism" when he spoke of the production of daily life as the determining element in history. No quote from Marx can be found to explain why his followers should not have full justification for their "crude materialism." I guess it's only another accident that most marxists are economic determinists.

L-Ms mention Bakunin's secret organization as the justification for the expulsion of all anarchists (not just Bakunin and the circle of which he was a part) from the First International. They usually fail to mention the anarchists complied with every demand made upon the International Alliance, indeed even reducing it to open, individual sections of the International. After the anarchists complied with every Marxian demand and Marx still could not provoke the anarchists to walk out, Marx convened the next meeting in Belgium (1872) rather than in Switzerland. He knew Belgium had closed its borders to most latin revolutionaries. Switzerland was the usual location for such meetings because of its more central location and because it was more open to radicals of all types. Even so, the Belgian meeting did not reach the decision to expel anarchists easily. Marx was so unsure of the lasting effects of his "victory" that he sent the headquarters of the International to the United States, where it died a quiet death. Marx later objected to every attempt to revive an international workers' organization.

As a parthian shot, I pose the question: Why do marxists, even L-Ms, describe themselves as the followers of a particular human being? A dead one at that. How does this differ from those who call themselves christians, jesuits, leninists, maoists, stalinists, etc.? Why is it one almost never finds anarchists calling themselves bakuninists or kropotkinists?

In conclusion, most of Marx's ideas aren't worth the trouble of reclaiming from the present-day corruption of most of his followers. There's just enough ambiguity in Marx to justify most of the positions held by those "corrupt" marxists. Even if this were not the case, the L-M project to reclaim Marx from his "impure" followers has little or no relevance in today's social revolutionary context. Today, to be a marxist means one is a Third World Nationalist, opposed to imperialism; it means one is a member of a centralized political party ruled by a central committee, which is in turn ruled by a chairman, first citizen, maximum leader, etc.; in other words, a dictator. No room for anarchists there!

Jim Bumpas
c/o SRAF, Box 4091, Mtn. View, CA 94040

Root & Branch replies:

The bulk of Jim Bumpas's letter merely *repeats* the charges which Diemer's articles examined—that Marx's theoretical work stands or falls, and in fact falls, with the activities and regimes of those who call themselves Marxists; and that Bakunin was therefore correct in portraying Marx as a totalitarian. (Readers may be interested in the critique by Sam Dolgoff, similar but fleshed out with more evidence and argument, published with a reply by Diemer in the Winter 1979 issue of *The Red Menace*.)

As our introduction to Diemer's articles stated, we feel that Diemer is on the wrong track in downplaying Marx's materialism. Marx's insistence that social movements arise from people's experience of their conditions of life rather than from the ideas of theoreticians or inspired souls is part of his importance for libertarians. To find Marx important or even fundamental as a starting-point for radical thinking does not mean that we are "followers of a particular human being." (This is why we are not so excited about the question whether Marx was or was not personally authoritarian.) Our journal carries the label "Marxist" as a reference not to Marx but to the practical and theoretical orientation to capitalism that he worked out. We find it striking that in his letter Jim Bumpas never once deals with Marx's ideas and writings on the nature of capitalism—the main focus of his intellectual energies. We suspect the reason few anarchists call themselves Bakuninists or Kropotkinists is not an abhorrence of hero worship (the reverence of many anarchists for the holy trinity of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin makes that clear) but the fact that there is no coherent body of ideas to which such terms might refer.

Finally, with respect to the question of joint activity between libertarian Marxists and anarchists, we obviously recognize that people who condemn some people who call themselves "Marxists" because of the actions of *other* people who use this label will not be open to cooperative effort. We are not so sectarian, however, and see no reason to reject all anarchists because some of their number don't see us as comrades.

Dear comrades,

We salute the reappearance of *Root & Branch*. The formation of groups in many countries which are breaking with the forces of counter-revolution represented by leftism, or the confusions of a libertarianism which manifests itself in the search for alternative life styles and individual fulfillment in communes is a positive development. Constituting themselves on the basis of a firm recognition of the proletariat as the *only* subject of revolution in our epoch and on the bedrock of the class lines which the experience of the proletariat has drawn, the formation of these groups is one more sign that the re-emergence of the open crisis of capitalism marks the end of the more than fifty-year-long period of counter-revolution. The growing combativity of the class worldwide, whether faced with the dictatorship of capital in its "democratic" or Stalinist forms, or under the mask of "national liberation," the weakening of the left's stranglehold over the proletariat and the search for marxist coherence represented by comrades from Hong Kong to India, from Scandanavia to the U.S.—which is an expression of the resurgence of the class—all indicate that the historic course is towards class war.

The very real theoretical links with the German and Dutch left—one of the currents which made vital contributions and heroically resisted the tide of counter-revolution before it too was overcome by despair in the face of Stalinism, fascism and inter-imperialist war—which you have will be one important factor in your capacity to contribute to the development of class consciousness within the proletariat, since the theoretical contributions of the communist left are one of the foundations on which the new political elements of the class must base themselves. However, we are convinced that if you take up the theoretical thread of the German and Dutch left in the form of the council communism of the '30s rather than the analyses and positions of the KAPD during the revolutionary wave itself, and if you ignore the vital contributions of the Italian left during the '30s, for example on the war in Spain (cf. the texts reprinted in our International Review #4, 6 and 7), fascism and anti-fascism, democracy, the national question, where the position that national liberation struggles are a moment in the struggle between rival *imperialist* blocs is in contrast to views like Pannekoek's that a progressive development of a "youthful" capitalism is possible in Asia, your positions will suffer from ambiguities and confusions.

If we insist on the importance of the contributions of the communist left, it is not because we think that the task of revolutionaries consists in simply republishing old texts, but because assimilating the theoretical heritage of the communist left is an essential element in the capacity of revolutionaries to analyze the perspectives of the crisis *today*, the course of inter-imperialist antagonisms *today*, the balance of class forces *today*. These analyses are the bases upon which we can carry out our primary task of intervention in the class struggle.

In this sense your celebration of the revival of the Spanish CNT is particularly disturbing. You completely overlook the role of the anarchists in mobilizing the workers of Spain for imperialist war in the late '30s (cf. our article "Spain 1936: The Myth of the Anarchist Collectives," *International Review* 15) and the participation of the CNT in the government of the Spanish republic which massacred the working class in 1937—actions by which Spanish anarchism definitively joined the camp of the counter-revolution. You completely fail to see and to clearly denounce the counter-revolutionary role of the CNT in Spain today, where anarchism still remains a very formidable mystification, a powerful obstacle in the way of the struggle of the proletariat, and —with its ideology of self-management—a mortal danger to the working class as it again takes the path of violent class struggle and confrontation with the democratic bourgeois state.

It is this point, among others, which we take up in an article welcoming the reappearance of *Root & Branch*, and criticizing the weaknesses we see, which will appear in Internationalism 18. We hope that through such articles, correspondence and *meetings* a real confrontation of positions can take place between us, and that the process of discussion and clarification between revolutionaries already begun in Europe (cf. the international conferences in Oslo, Milan and recently in Paris) can now be extended to the new world as well.

Fraternally,
International Communist Current
17 December 1978

NUCLEAR POWER IS NO ACCIDENT



SMASH CAPITALISM NOT ATOMS

ROOT & BRANCH

With the 1960s the eternal prosperity, the managed economy, and the attendant "death of ideology" of the post-World War II period came to an end. The combination of unemployment and inflation in the capitalist West and the inability of the state-run systems of the East to satisfy their working classes are producing unsettling effects throughout "industrial society": the deterioration of conditions in the big cities, which nonetheless draw an increasing proportion of the world's population; the brutalization of the seemingly permanent army of the unemployed, which has been accumulating in these urban centers; the instability of governments in the democracies, in the absence of any clear policy alternatives, inspiring a drift toward open authoritarianism; the development of opposition to the party dictatorships in the East, both in the form of liberalism among the intelligentsia and, more significantly, in that of strike movements among the working classes; and the continuing decay of ideologies and social norms. All this testifies to the basic character of the "limits of growth" that modern society is coming up against.

Whatever disappointments Nature has in store for us in the future, the limits we are encountering now are not ecological but social ones. It is not even socially caused, environmental disaster but the third world war that most directly threatens our extinction. That a fascination with zero-growth has replaced the nineteenth century's discovery of eternal progressive development is only the ideological form of the experience of the bankruptcy as a social system of capitalism and its state-run analog.

As yet we cannot speak of the existence anywhere in the world of forces or social movements which represent a real possibility of social revolution. But, while in no way inevitable, social revolution is clearly necessary if possibilities for an enjoyable and decent life are to be realized—and perhaps if human life is to be preserved at all. For this reason we see the overthrow of the present order of society as the goal to which we as a group wish to contribute. While the ideal we aim for has been called by a variety of names—communism, socialism, anarchism—what is important to us is the idea of a system in which social life is controlled by those whose activities make it up. Capitalism has created the basis of such a system by so interweaving the production and consumption of all producers that only collective solutions are possible to meet the producers' need to control the means and process of production and distribution. To eliminate the problems caused by the subordination of social production to capital's need for profit, the working class must take direct responsibility for what it already produces. This means opposition not only to the existing ruling class of capitalists and politicians but to any future managers or party leaders seeking to hold power in our name. *Root & Branch*, therefore, holds to the tradition of the workers' movement expressed in the Provisional Rules of the First International, beginning with the consideration "that the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves."

From the past we draw not only inspiration and still-meaningful ideas but also lessons on mistakes to be avoided. The fundamental idea of the old labor movement, that the working class can build up its forces in large organizations in preparation for the "final conflict" has proven false. Whether the organization was that of reformist or of revolutionary parties, producer or consumer cooperatives, or trade unions, its success has always turned out to be a success in adapting to the exigencies of survival within capitalism. The Bolshevik alternative of the small vanguard of revolutionaries preparing for the day when they would lead the masses to the conquest of state power has also proven useless for our purposes. Such parties have had a role to play only in the unindustrialized areas of the world, where they have provided the ruling class needed to carry out the work of forced economic development unrealized by the native bourgeoisie. In the developed countries they have been condemned either to sectarian insignificance or to transformation into reformist parties of the social-democratic type.

While history has indicated that there can be no revolutionary movement except in periods of revolution, the principles of such a future movement must guide the activity of those who wish to contribute to its creation. These principles—in contrast to those of the old labor movement—must signify a total break with the foundation of capitalist society, the relation between wage-labor and capital. As our goal is that of workers' control over social life, our principles must be those of *direct, collective action*. *Direct*, because the struggle for control of society begins with the struggle to control our fight against the current order. *Collective*, because the only successes which have a future are those involving (if only in principle) the class as a whole. We recognize that the working class does not have one uniform identity, and thus experiences oppression under capitalism differently according to age, sex, race, nationality, etc. However, what defines and thus unites the working class is its exploitation by capital, even if the character of that exploitation varies giving the appearance of separate problems and thus separate solutions. While it is true that the struggle against capitalism will not by itself solve these problems, overcoming capitalist exploitation raises the possibility of their solutions. Thus, each working-class struggle, even if it does not address an issue experienced by the class as a whole, must be aimed at the real enemy, capital, and not other members of the class. In the same way, we think workers must overcome in action the division between employed and unemployed, between unionized and non-unionized members of their class. Such a view automatically brings us into opposition to existing organizations like trade unions, which exist by representing the short-term interests of particular groups of workers within the existing social structure. Similarly, we are in conflict with the parties and sects which see their own dominance over any future movement as the key to its success.

We see ourselves as neither leaders nor bystanders but as part of the struggle. We are for a florescence of groups like ours and also for cooperation in common tasks. We initiate and participate in activity where we work, study, and live. As a group, we would like to be of some use in making information available about past and present struggles and in discussing the conclusions to be drawn from this history and its future extension. We organize lectures and study groups. Since 1969 we have published a journal and series of pamphlets. We hope others will join us to discuss the ideas and the materials we publish and that they will help us to develop new ideas and means to circulate and realize them.



SMASH CAPITALISM NOT ATOMS

In 1964, a government-released study predicted that a melt-down at a nuclear plant like Seabrook could kill 27,000 people and injure 73,000, not to mention the cancers and birth defects to come. Nukes, however, are just the tip of the iceberg. Cancer-causing chemical dumps at Love Canal, N.Y., Attleboro, MA., and elsewhere, Ford Pintos which burst into flames when hit from behind, the 115,000 deaths each year from industrial accidents and industrial-related diseases, Agent Orange and PCB's, the list stretches on. Business as usual is becoming more and more of a daily threat to our lives and environment.

This threat is not merely a natural consequence of modern industry and technology. Nor is it the fault of the wastefulness and greed of the population as a whole. It is the result of decisions made by the corporations --decisions aimed not at the satisfaction of our needs and desires but at the maintenance of their position in a social structure based on hierarchy, profitability, and exploitation.

To accuse business of being shortsighted or greedy, however, is to miss the point. Enterprises must make money to stay in business. Making money calls for cutting costs and--especially in a period of recession--job and environmental safety are "extras" which can make the difference between economic success and failure.

Since the American economy is a business economy, the government must follow the same logic of decision-making. Some politicians may oppose some corporations to some extent in response to public outcry. But, aside from the politicians' financial involvement in business, they know that low profits for big corporations means recession, unemployment, and social unrest. Hence the recent whittling away of EPA standards; hence the support for nuclear power.

NUCLEAR POWER IS NO ACCIDENT

The choice of nuclear energy, for which some of us are now literally paying with our lives, was based on the convergence of the state's military needs and the profit interests of many powerful corporations. Today the $26 billion already invested in nukes means high stakes for the industries involved: stopping the nukes could lead to financial collapse and loss of control over crucial sectors of the economy.

The pro-nuclear statement signed recently by world leaders in Tokyo; Carter's renewed commitment to nukes in his Kansas City speech; the Senate's killing of the moratorium amendment--all underline the government's continuing support for nuclear power. Even Jerry Brown, despite his attempt to make political hay while the anti-nuke sun shines, is only calling for a moratorium, not for a definite end to nuclear power.

Even if the government is forced to decrease the country's reliance on nukes, we can be sure that any alternative constrained by "economic necessity"

and "national security" (just whose security? we might ask) will not resolve our problems. Carter's suggested massive conversion to synthetic fuels would mean increased pollution from coal and shale mining--industries already notorious for high cancer rates among workers, disruption of the ecosphere due to higher concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and more toxic wastes to dispose of. And even conversion to solar power--highly unlikely despite the many well-reasoned and -researched proposals--would leave the world's atomic arsenals intact.

Proposals for community-controlled, de-centralized technologies organized on a non-profit basis usually rely on some form of government financing. In a period in which global economic crunch has already brought us cutbacks in social services, the government is unlikely to turn into a miraculous supplier of funds. Moreover, the government is hardly likely to sponsor competition for the big businesses it represents. What we need is not funding and approval, but the power to create and control alternatives ourselves. Government sponsorship is not the route to such power.

The demand for "solar jobs," which addresses the very real problem of unemployment, points to the absurdity of the criteria that capitalism imposes on us. The real issue is control over social decision-making, working conditions, and the goods produced; and not the issue of choosing between jobs and welfare.

Which will it be: Lung cancer or death by radiation? Nuclear power or economic crisis? Polluted skies and rivers or war scare? More jobs or more radiation? Workers' health and safety or a safe and healthy economy? These "choices", these "alternatives", are the blackmail of capitalism. To refuse them is to raise the question of the conversion of society as a whole, root and branch.

SEDITION NOT PETITION

Many anti-nukers still find it hard to believe that "our leaders" would blatantly disregard the safety of the "citizenry" and cynically manipulate any opposition, loyal or otherwise. However, recent calls for direct action against nuclear plant construction sites indicate that at least some people within the movement are beginning to see the limitations of compliance with the authorities.

The call for the Oct. 6 occupation speaks of a commitment "to stop nuclear power ourselves, without appealing to or recognizing the legitimacy of state or corporate authority," and of going beyond "civil disobedience and other symbolic forms of protest." This points to a willingness to begin acting collectively for ourselves and to stop relying on the people in power to do it for us.

We support the questioning of authority, and the growing recognition that our enemies include the courts, the politicians, the regulators, and the police as well as the nuclear industry. But to say that "our strength lies in our numbers, in the depth of understanding" of the participants, "and in our commitment to refrain from any acts of violence" is to admit how little strength we have as yet.

Non-violent opposition to authority is a reasonable tactic given our position of weakness. We should remember, however, that from the authorities' point of view tresspassing--not to mention interfering with the owners' control of their property--is violence against the property right of a citizen, which the state is sworn to defend, with violence if necessary. In fact, however deep our understanding, the number of protestors will not prevent their arrest and removal from the Seabrook site. The truth is that the project to "transform the site to meet real human needs" is beyond what we can do today.

What, then, is possible?

In the short run, we support any attempt to disrupt the fission industry and help preserve a world worth winning. In the longer run, if the anti-nuke movement perseveres, it will be forced to recognize that the power needed to achieve its goals is incompatible with the power which serves to perpetuate the current social order. The unity of the "socialist" East with the capitalist West on the issue of nuclear power is an indication of the global nature of the problem. The solution will require a broader social movement whose aim is the construction of a world where social decisions are made directly and democratically by those they will affect. In such a society, science and technology would be used to free us from drudgery and scarcity, and increase the pleasures we take from life. This vision might seem utopian, but taking it seriously may be the only way not simply to end nuclear power but to preserve human life itself.